The Cutoff Structure of Top Trading
Cycles in School Choice
Supplementary Appendix

C Proofs for Section 2

C.1 Proof of Theorem 1
For each student $s$, let $B(s,p) = \{c | r^*_b \geq p^*_b \text{ for some } b\}$. It suffices to show that for each student $s$ it holds that $\mu_{dTTC}(s) \in B(s,p)$, and that if $c \in B(s,p)$ then $s$ prefers $\mu_{dTTC}(s)$ to $c$, i.e. $\mu_{dTTC}(s) \succeq^s c$. The former is simple to show, since if we let $b$ be the school such that $s$ traded a seat at school $b$ for a seat at school $\mu_{dTTC}(s)$, then by definition $p^*_b \leq r^*_b$ and $\mu_{dTTC}(s) \in B(s,p)$.

Now suppose for the sake of contradiction that $c \in B(s,p)$ and student $s$ strictly prefers $c$ to $\mu_{dTTC}(s)$, i.e. $c \succ^s \mu_{dTTC}(s)$. As $c \in B(s,p)$ there exists a school $b'$ such that $r^*_b \geq p^*_b$. Let $s'$ be the student with rank $r^*_{b'} = p^*_{b'}$ at school $b'$. (Such a student exists since $p^*_{b'} \leq r^*_b < 1$.) Then by definition student $s'$ traded a seat at school $b'$, so since $r^*_{b'} \geq p^*_{b'} = r^*_{b'}$ student $s$ is assigned weakly before student $s'$. Additionally, since $c \succ^s \mu_{dTTC}(s)$ school $c$ must reach capacity before student $s$ is assigned, and so since student $s'$ was assigned to school $c$ student $s'$ was assigned strictly before student $s$. This provides the required contradiction.

C.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Let the schools be indexed such that they reach capacity in the order $1, 2, \ldots, |C|$. If a student $s$ was assigned (strictly) after school $\ell - 1$ reached capacity and (weakly) before school $\ell$ reached capacity, we say that the student $s$ was assigned in round $\ell$.

Given TTC cutoffs $p^*_b$ from Theorem 1, we define new cutoffs $\{\tilde{p}^*_b\}$ by setting $\tilde{p}^*_b = \min_{c \leq c, c} p^*_b$. It evidently holds that $\tilde{p}^*_1 \geq \tilde{p}^*_2 \geq \cdots \geq \tilde{p}^*_b = \tilde{p}^{b+1} = \cdots = \tilde{p}^*_n$ for all $b$. We show that the cutoffs $\{\tilde{p}^*_b\}$ give the same allocation as the cutoffs $\{p^*_b\}$, i.e. for each student $s$ it holds that

$$\max \{c | r^*_b \geq \tilde{p}^*_b \text{ for some } b\} = \mu_{dTTC}(s) = \max \{c | r^*_b \geq p^*_b \text{ for some } b\}.$$
For each student $s$ let $B(s, \tilde{p}) = \{c | r_s^b \geq \tilde{p}_b^c \text{ for some } b\}$. It suffices to show that for each student $s$ it holds that $\mu_{dTTC} (s) \in B(s, \tilde{p})$, and that if $c \in B(s, \tilde{p})$ then $s$ prefers $\mu_{dTTC} (s)$ to $c$, i.e. $\mu (s) \triangleright^s c$. The former is simple to show, since clearly $\tilde{p} \leq p$ and so $B(s, \tilde{p}) \supseteq B(s, p) \ni \mu_{dTTC} (s)$ (by Theorem 1).

The rest of the proof can be completed in much the same way as the proof of Theorem 1. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that $c \in B(s, \tilde{p})$ and student $s$ strictly prefers $c$ to $\mu_{dTTC} (s)$, i.e. $c \succ^s \mu_{dTTC} (s)$. As $c \in B(s, \tilde{p})$ there exists a school $b'$ such that $r^s_{b'} \geq \tilde{p}_{b'}^c$. Let $s'$ be the student with rank $r^s_{b'} = \tilde{p}_{b'}^c$ at school $b'$. (Such a student exists since $\tilde{p}_{b'}^c \leq r^s_{b'} < 1$.) Then by definition student $s'$ traded a seat at school $b'$, so since $r^s_{b'} \geq \tilde{p}_{b'}^c = r^s_{b'}$ student $s$ is assigned weakly before student $s'$. Additionally, since $c \succ^s \mu_{dTTC} (s)$ school $c$ must reach capacity before student $s$ is assigned. Finally, by definition there exists some $c' \leq c$ such that $\tilde{p}_{b'}^c = p_{b'}^c$ and student $s'$ was assigned to school $c'$, and so student $s'$ was assigned weakly before school $c$ reached capacity, and hence strictly before student $s$. This provides the required contradiction.

The statements about the structure of the set of schools $B_b (s, p)$ student $s$ can afford via her priority at school $b$ and the structure of the budget set $B(s, p) = \bigcup_{b} B_b (s, p)$ follow immediately from the ordered cutoffs.

## D Proofs for Section 3

### D.1 Definitions and Notation

We begin with some additional definitions and notation that will be used in the proofs in this section.

In Appendix A.1 we outlined how the TTC path $\gamma$ can be interpreted as tracking the progression of the algorithm. Throughout the proofs, we make use of this interpretation and will frequently fix an economy $E$ and a TTC path $\gamma$ and let $TTC (\gamma|E)$ denote the continuous-time algorithm given by the path $\gamma$ on the economy $E$. Given a path $\gamma$, let $\{t^{(c)}\}_{c \in C}$ be stopping times such that $\gamma$ and $\{t^{(c)}\}_{c \in C}$ satisfy the capacity equations. Let the schools be labeled such that $t^{(c_1)} \leq t^{(c_2)} \leq \cdots \leq t^{(c_n)}$, and let $t^{(c_0)} = 0$. We will refer to the progression of the algorithm from time $t^{(c_{\ell-1})}$ to time $t^{(c_\ell)}$ as Round $\ell$ of $TTC(\gamma)$.

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38 The economy $E$ can either be a continuum economy, or a discrete economy $E$, in which case we let $TTC (\gamma|\Psi (E))$ denote $TTC (\gamma|\Psi (E))$.

39 We will omit the dependence on the economy when it is evident from context.
Let $\underline{x}, \overline{x}$ be vectors. We let $(\underline{x}, \overline{x}) = \{x : x \not\leq \underline{x} \text{ and } x \leq \overline{x}\}$ denote the set of vectors that are weakly smaller than $\overline{x}$ along every coordinate, and strictly larger than $\underline{x}$ along some coordinate. Let $K \subseteq C$ be a set of schools. For all vectors $x$, we let $\pi_K(x)$ denote the projection of $x$ to the coordinates indexed by schools in $K$.

The following notation is used to incorporate information about the set of available schools. For an economy $E$ and TTC path $\gamma$ yielding TTC cutoffs $\mathbf{p}$ we let $C(x) = \{c \mid \exists b \text{ s.t. } p_b^c \leq x_b\}$ denote the set of schools available to students with rank $x$. We denote by

$$\Theta^c = \{\theta \in \Theta \mid Ch^\theta(C) = c\}$$

the set of students whose top choice in $C$ is $c$, and denote by $\eta^c$ the measure of these students. That is, for $S \subseteq \Theta$, let $\eta^c(S) := \eta(S \cap \Theta^c)$. In an abuse of notation, for a set $A \subseteq [0,1]^C$, we will often let $\eta(A)$ denote $\eta(\{\theta \in \Theta \mid r^\theta \in A\})$, the measure of students with ranks in $A$, and let $\eta^c(A)$ denote $\eta(\{\theta \in \Theta^c \mid r^\theta \in A\})$, the measure of students with ranks in $A$ whose top choice school in $C$ is $c$.

We will also find it convenient to define sets of students who were offered or assigned a seat along some TTC path $\gamma$. These will be useful in considering the result of aggregating the marginal trade balance equations. For each time $\tau$ let

$$T_c(\gamma; \tau) \overset{def}{=} \{\theta \in \Theta \mid \exists \tau' \leq \tau \text{ s.t. } r^\theta_c = \gamma_c(\tau') \text{ and } r^\theta \leq \gamma(\tau')\}$$

denote the set of students who were offered a seat by school $c$ before time $\tau$, let

$$T^c(\gamma; \tau) \overset{def}{=} \{\theta \in \Theta \mid r^\theta \not\leq \gamma(\tau) \text{ and } Ch^\theta(C) = c\}$$

denote the set of students who were assigned a seat at school $c$ before time $\tau$, and let

$$T^{c|C}(\gamma; \tau) \overset{def}{=} \{\theta \in \Theta \mid r^\theta \not\leq \gamma(\tau) \text{ and } Ch^\theta(C) = c\}$$

denote the set of students who would be assigned a seat at school $c$ before time $\tau$ if the set of available schools was $C$ and the path followed was $\gamma$.\(^{40}\)

For each interval $T = [t, \overline{t}]$ let $T_c(\gamma; T) \overset{def}{=} \cup_{t \leq \tau < \overline{t}} T_c(\gamma; \tau)$ be the set of students who were offered a seat by school $c$ at some time $\tau \in T$, and let $T^{c|C}(T; \gamma) \overset{def}{=} T^{c|C}(\gamma; \overline{t}) \setminus T^{c|C}(\gamma; t)$ be the set of students who were assigned to a school $c$ at some time $\tau \in T$, given that the set of available schools was $C(\gamma(\tau)) = C$ for each $\tau \in T$. For each union of disjoint intervals $T = \cup_n T_n$ similar define $T_c(\gamma; T) \overset{def}{=} \cup_n T_c(\gamma; T_n)$.

\(^{40}\)Note that $T_c(\gamma; \tau)$ and $T^c(\gamma; \tau)$ include students who were offered or assigned a seat in the school in previous rounds.
Figure 16: The sets $T_c(\gamma; t)$ and $T^c(\gamma; t)$ for an economy with two schools and a fixed path $\gamma$ and time $t$. $T_c(\gamma; t)$ denotes the set of students who were offered a seat by school $c$ by time $t$, and $T^c(\gamma; t)$ denotes the set of students who were assigned to school $c$ by time $t$. Students in each set are shaded in grey. Note that students are no longer offered seats once they are assigned, and so only students with priorities on the path $\gamma$ are offered seats by both schools.

and $T^{c|C}(T; \gamma) \overset{df}{=} \cup_n T^{c|C}(T_n; \gamma)$. Figure 16 illustrates examples of $T_c$ and $T^c$ for an economy with two schools.

Finally let us set up the definitions for solving the marginal trade balance equations. For a set of schools $C$ and individual schools $b, c \in C$, recall that

$$H^c_b(x) = \lim_{\varepsilon \to 0} \frac{1}{\varepsilon \eta} \left\{ \theta \in \Theta \mid r^\theta \in [x_b - \varepsilon) \cdot e^b, x) \text{ and } C^{t^\theta}(C) = c \right\}$$

$$= \lim_{\varepsilon \to 0} \frac{1}{\varepsilon \eta} \left\{ \theta \in \Theta^{c|C} \mid r^\theta \in [(x_b - \varepsilon) \cdot e^b, x) \right\}$$

is the marginal density of students pointed to by school $b$ at the point $x$ whose top choice school in $C$ is $c$.

Let $H^C(x)$ be the $|C| \times |C|$ matrix with $(b, c)$th entry $H^C(x)_{b,c} = H^c_b(x)$. Let $\tilde{H}^C(x)$ be the $|C| \times |C|$ matrix with $(b, c)$th entry

$$\tilde{H}^C(x)_{b,c} = \frac{1}{\overline{v}} H^c_b(x) + 1_{b=c} \left( 1 - \frac{v_c}{\overline{v}} \right),$$

where $v_c = \sum_{d \in C} H^d_c(x)$ is the row sum of $H(x)$, and the normalization $\overline{v}$ satisfies $\overline{v} \geq \max_c v_c$. $\tilde{H}^C(x)$ is a transformation of $H^C(x)$ that will be convenient for for-
malizing the connection with continuous time Markov chains presented in Appendix A.3.

Recall that a TTC path $\gamma$ satisfies the trade balance equations for an economy $E = (C, \Theta, \eta, q)$ if the following holds:

$$\sum_{a \in C} \gamma'_a(t) H^c_a(\gamma(t)) = \sum_{a \in C} \gamma'_c(t) H^a_c(\gamma(t)) \quad \forall c \in C,$$

These may be equivalently stated in terms of the matrix $\tilde{H}(\gamma(t))$ as follows:

$$\gamma'(t) = \gamma'(t) \cdot \tilde{H}(\gamma(t)).$$

Let $\gamma(\tau) = x$. If $d = -\gamma'(\tau) \geq 0$ solves the trade balance equations for $x$ with available schools $C$

$$\sum_{a \in C} d_a \cdot H^c_{aC}(x) = \sum_{a \in C} d_c \cdot H^a_{cC}(x) \quad \forall c \in C,$$

or equivalently

$$d = d \cdot \tilde{H}(x)$$

we say that $d$ is a valid gradient at $x$ with available schools $C$, and if in addition $d \cdot 1 = -1$ then we say that $d$ is a valid direction at $x$ with available schools $C$. We omit the references to $x$ and $C$ when they are clear from context.

Let $M^C(x)$ be the Markov chain with state space $C$, and transition probability from state $b$ to state $c$ equal to $\tilde{H}^C(\gamma(t))_{b,c}$. We remark that such a Markov chain exists, since $\tilde{H}^C(x)$ is a (right) stochastic matrix for each pair $C, x$.

We will also need the following definitions. For a matrix $H$ and sets of indices $I, J$ we let $H_{I,J}$ denote the submatrix of $H$ with rows indexed by elements of $I$ and columns indexed by elements of $J$. Recall that, by Assumption 1, the measure $\eta$ is defined by a probability density $\nu$ that is right-continuous and piecewise Lipschitz continuous with points of discontinuity on a finite grid. Let the finite grid be the set of points $\{x \mid x_i \in D_i \forall i\}$, where the $D_i$ are finite subsets of $[0,1]$. Then there exists a partition $R$ of $[0,1]^C$ into hyperrectangles such that for each $R \in R$ and each face of $R$, there exists an index $i$ and $y_i \in D_i$ such that the face is contained in $\{x \mid x_i = y_i\}$.

The following notion of continuity will be useful, given this grid-partition. We say that a multivariate function $f : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}$ is right-continuous if $f(x) = \lim_{y \to x, y \geq x} f(y)$, where $x, y$ are vectors in $\mathbb{R}^n$ and the inequalities hold coordinate-wise. For an $m \times n$
matrix $A$, let $1(A)$ be the $m \times n$ matrix with entries
\[
1(A)_{ij} = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } A_{ij} \neq 0, \\
0 & \text{if } A_{ij} = 0.
\end{cases}
\]

We will want some way of comparing two TTC paths $\gamma$ and $\tilde{\gamma}$ obtained under two continuum economies differing only in their measures $\eta$ and $\tilde{\eta}$.

**Definition 4.** Let $\gamma$ and $\tilde{\gamma}$ be increasing continuous functions from $[0, 1]$ to $[0, 1]^C$ with $\gamma(0) = \tilde{\gamma}(0)$. We say that $\gamma(\tau)$ is dominated by $\tilde{\gamma}(\tau)$ via school $c$ if
\[
\gamma_c(\tau) = \tilde{\gamma}_c(\tau), \quad \text{and} \quad 
\gamma_b(\tau) \leq \tilde{\gamma}_b(\tau) \quad \text{for all } b \in C.
\]

We also say that $\gamma$ is dominated by $\tilde{\gamma}$ via school $c$ at time $\tau$. If $\gamma$ and $\gamma'$ are TTC paths, we can interpret this as school $c$ being less demanded under $\gamma$, since with the same rank at $c$, in $\gamma$ students are competitive with fewer ranks at other schools $b$. Equivalently, the same rank at $c$ is less valuable under $\gamma$ than under $\tilde{\gamma}$, as it provides the same opportunities for assignment as lower ranks at other schools (i.e. worse opportunities) under $\gamma$ compared to $\tilde{\gamma}$. Another interpretation is that more students have been offered seats by the time $t$ at which we reach students with a given $c$-rank under $\gamma$ than under $\tilde{\gamma}$. A third interpretation is that fewer students are offered / trade away seats at school $c$ at time $t$ under $\gamma$ than under $\tilde{\gamma}$.

**D.2 Basic Lemmas**

We will also make use of the following lemmas.

**Lemma 2.** Let $\mathcal{E} = (C, \Theta, \eta, q)$ be a continuum economy such that $\tilde{H}(x)$ is irreducible for all $x$ and $C$. Then there exists a unique valid TTC path $\gamma$. Within each round $\gamma(\cdot)$ is given by
\[
\frac{d\gamma(t)}{dt} = d(\gamma(t))
\]
where $d(x)$ is the unique valid direction from $x = \gamma(t)$ that satisfies $d(x) = d(x) \tilde{H}(x)$.

Moreover, if we let $A(x)$ be obtained from $\tilde{H}(x) - I$ by replacing the $n$th column with the all ones vector $1$, then
\[
d(x) = [0, 0, \ldots, 0, -1] A(x)^{-1}.
\]
Proof. It suffices to show that $d(\cdot)$ is unique. The existence and uniqueness of $\gamma(\cdot)$ satisfying $\frac{d\gamma(t)}{dt} = d(\gamma(t))$ follows by invoking Picard-Lindelöf as in the proof of Theorem 2.

Consider the equations,

$$
\begin{align*}
    d(x) \tilde{H}(x) &= d(x) \\
    d(x) \cdot 1 &= -1.
\end{align*}
$$

When $\tilde{H}(x)$ is irreducible, every choice of $n - 1$ columns of $\tilde{H}(x) - I$ gives an independent set whose span does not contain 1. Therefore if we let $A(x)$ be given by replacing the $n$th column in $\tilde{H}(x) - I$ with 1, then $A(x)$ has full rank, and the above equations are equivalent to

$$
\begin{align*}
    d(x) A(x) &= [0, 0, \ldots, 0, -1], \\
    \text{i.e. } d(x) &= [0, 0, \ldots, 0, -1] A(x)^{-1}.
\end{align*}
$$

Hence $d(x)$ is unique for each $x$, and hence $\gamma(\cdot)$ is uniquely determined.

We now show that any two non-increasing continuous paths $\gamma$, $\tilde{\gamma}$ starting and ending at the same point can be re-parametrized so that for all $t$ there exists a school $c(\tau)$ such that $\gamma$ is dominated by $\tilde{\gamma}$ via school $c(\tau)$ at time $t$. We first show that, if $\gamma(0) \leq \tilde{\gamma}(0)$, then there exists a re-parametrization of $\gamma$ such that $\gamma$ is dominated by $\tilde{\gamma}$ on some interval starting at 0.

Lemma 3. Suppose $\gamma$, $\tilde{\gamma}$ are a pair of non-increasing functions $[0, 1] \to [0, 1]^C$ such that $\gamma(0) \leq \tilde{\gamma}(0)$. Then there exist coordinates $c, b$, a time $\bar{\tau}$ and an increasing function $g: \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$ such that $\gamma_b(g(\bar{\tau})) = \tilde{\gamma}_b(\bar{\tau})$, and for all $\tau \in [0, \bar{\tau}]$ it holds that

$$
\gamma_c(g(\tau)) = \tilde{\gamma}_c(\tau) \text{ and } \gamma(g(\tau)) \leq \tilde{\gamma}(\tau).
$$

That is, if we renormalize the time parameter $\tau$ of $\gamma(\tau)$ so that $\gamma$ and $\tilde{\gamma}$ agree along the $c$th coordinate, then $\gamma$ is dominated by $\tilde{\gamma}$ via school $c$ at all times $\tau \in [0, \bar{\tau}]$, and is also dominated via school $b$ at time $\bar{\tau}$.

Proof. The idea is that if we take the smallest function $g$ such that there exists a coordinate $c$ such that for all $\tau$ sufficiently small $\gamma_c(g(\tau)) = \tilde{\gamma}_c(\tau)$, then $\gamma(g(\tau)) \leq \tilde{\gamma}(\tau)$ for all $\tau$ sufficiently small. The lemma then follows from continuity. We make this precise.
Fix a coordinate $c$. Let $g^{(c)}$ be the renormalization of $\gamma$ so that $\gamma$ and $\tilde{\gamma}$ agree along the $c$th coordinate, i.e. $\gamma_c (g^{(c)} (\tau)) = \tilde{\gamma}_c (\tau)$ for all $\tau$.

For all $\tau$, we define the set $\kappa_\gamma^{(c)} (\tau) = \{ b \mid \gamma_b (g^{(c)} (\tau)) > \tilde{\gamma}_b (\tau) \}$ of schools $b$ along which the $\gamma$ curve renormalized along coordinate $c$ has larger $b$-value at time $\tau$ than $\tilde{\gamma}_b$ has at time $\tau$, and similarly define the set $\kappa_b^{(c)} (\tau) = \{ b \mid \gamma_b (g^{(c)} (\tau)) = \tilde{\gamma}_b (\tau) \}$ where the renormalized $\gamma$ curve is equal to $\tilde{\gamma}$. It suffices to show that there exists $b, c$ and a time $\bar{t}$ such that $\kappa_\gamma^{(c)} (\tau) = \emptyset$ for all $\tau \in [0, \bar{t}]$ and $b \in \kappa_b^{(c)} (\bar{t})$.

Since $\gamma$ and $\tilde{\gamma}$ are continuous, there exists some maximal $\bar{t}^{(c)} > 0$ such that the functions $\kappa_\gamma^{(c)} (\cdot)$ and $\kappa_b^{(c)} (\cdot)$ are constant over the interval $\left(0, \bar{t}^{(c)} \right)$. If there exists $c$ such that $\kappa_\gamma^{(c)} (\tau) = \emptyset$ for all $\tau \in \left(0, \bar{t}^{(c)} \right)$ then by continuity there exists some time $\bar{t} \leq \bar{t}^{(c)}$ and school $b$ such that $b \in \kappa_b^{(c)} (\bar{t})$ and we are done. Hence we may assume that for all $c$ it holds that $\kappa_\gamma^{(c)} (\tau) = C^{(c)}_{\geq}$ for all $\tau \in \left(0, \bar{t}^{(c)} \right)$ for some fixed non-empty set $C^{(c)}_{\geq}$. We will show that this leads to a contradiction.

We first claim that if $b \in C^{(c)}_{\geq}$, then $g^{(b)}(\tau) > g^{(c)}(\tau)$ for all $\tau \in (0, \bar{t})$. This is because $\gamma$ is non-increasing and $\gamma_b (g^{(b)} (\tau)) = \tilde{\gamma}_b (\tau) < \gamma_b (g^{(c)} (\tau))$ for all $\tau \in (0, \bar{t})$, where the equality follows from the definition of $g^{(b)}$ and the inequality since $b \in C^{(c)}_{\geq}$. But this completes the proof, since it implies that for all $c$ there exists $b$ such that $g^{(b)}(\tau) > g^{(c)}(\tau)$ for all $\tau \in (0, \bar{t})$, which is impossible since there are a finite number of schools $c \in C$.

We are now ready to show that there exists a re-parametrization of $\gamma$ such that $\gamma$ always is dominated by $\tilde{\gamma}$ via some school.

**Lemma 4.** Suppose $\bar{t} \geq 0$ and $\gamma, \tilde{\gamma}$ are a pair of non-increasing functions $[0, \bar{t}] \rightarrow [0, 1]^C$ such that $\gamma(0) \leq \tilde{\gamma}(0) = 1$ with equality on at least one coordinate, and $0 = \gamma(1) \leq \tilde{\gamma}(1)$ with equality on at least one coordinate. Then there exists an increasing function $g : [0, \bar{t}] \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ such that for all $\tau \geq 0$, there exists a school $c(\tau)$ such that $\gamma (g(\tau))$ is dominated by $\tilde{\gamma} (\tau)$ via school $c (\tau)$.

**Proof.** Without loss of generality let us assume that $\bar{t} = 1$. Fix a coordinate $c$. We define $g^{(c)}$ to be the renormalization of $\gamma$ so that $\gamma$ and $\tilde{\gamma}$ agree along the $c$th coordinate. Formally, let $\bar{\tau}^{(c)} = \min \{ \tau \mid \gamma_c (0) \geq \tilde{\gamma}_c (\tau) \}$ and define $g^{(c)}$ so that $\gamma_c (g^{(c)} (\tau)) = \tilde{\gamma}_c (\tau)$ for all $\tau \in [\bar{\tau}^{(c)}, 1]$. Let $A^{(c)}$ be the set of times $\tau$ such that $\gamma (g^{(c)} (\tau))$ is dominated by $\tilde{\gamma} (\tau)$. The idea is to pick $g$ to be equal to $g^{(c)}$ in $A^{(c)}$. In order to do this formally, we need to show that the sets $A^{(c)}$ cover $[0, 1]$, and then turn (a suitable subset of) $A^{(c)}$ into a union of disjoint closed intervals, on each of which we can define $g(\cdot) \equiv g^{(c)}(\cdot)$. 

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We first show that $\cup_{c} A^{(c)} = [0, 1]$. Suppose not, so there exists some time $\tau$ such that for all $c \in X \overset{\text{def}}{=} \{c' : \tau \geq t^{(c')}\}$ there exists $b$ such that $\gamma^{(c)}(\tau) > \tilde{\gamma}^{(c)}(\tau)$. Note that for such $b, c$, since $\gamma^{(c)}$ is non-increasing this implies that $\gamma^{(b)}(0) \geq \tilde{\gamma}^{(b)}(\tau)$, and so the function $g^{(b)}(\tau)$ is defined at $\tau$, i.e. there exists $g^{(b)}(\tau)$ such that $\tilde{\gamma}^{(b)}(\tau) = \gamma^{(b)}(g^{(b)}(\tau))$. In other words, since $\gamma$ is non-increasing, for all $c \in X$ there exists $b$ such that $g^{(c)}(\tau) < g^{(b)}(\tau)$, and since $\gamma^{(b)}(0) \geq \tilde{\gamma}^{(b)}(\tau)$ it also holds that $b \in X$. This is a contradiction since $X$ is finite but non-empty (since $\gamma(0) \leq \tilde{\gamma}(0) = 1$, with equality on at least one coordinate).

We now turn (a suitable subset of $A^{(c)}$) into a union of disjoint closed intervals. By continuity, $A^{(c)}$ is closed. Consider the closure of the interior of $A^{(c)}$, which we denote by $B^{(c)}$. Since the interior of $A^{(c)}$ is open, it is a countable union of open intervals, and hence $B^{(c)}$ is a countable union of disjoint closed intervals. To show that $\cup_{c \in C} B^{(c)} = [0, 1]$, fix a time $\tau \in [0, 1]$. As $\cup_{c} A^{(c)} = [0, 1]$, there exists $c$ such that $\gamma(g^{(c)}(\tau)) \leq \tilde{\gamma}(\tau)$. Hence we may invoke Lemma 3 to show that there exists some school $b$, time $\bar{\tau} > \tau$ and an increasing function $g$ such that $\gamma^{(b)}(g^{(c)}(\bar{\tau})) = \tilde{\gamma}^{(b)}(\bar{\tau})$ and $\gamma^{(c)}(g^{(c)}(\bar{\tau})) \leq \tilde{\gamma}(\bar{\tau})$ for all $\tau' \in [\tau, \bar{\tau}]$. But by the definition of $g^{(b)}(\cdot)$ this means that $\gamma^{(b)}(g^{(c)}(\tau')) = \tilde{\gamma}^{(b)}(\bar{\tau}) = \gamma^{(b)}(g^{(b)}(\tau'))$ for all $\tau' \in [\tau, \bar{\tau}]$, and so $g \circ g^{(c)} = g^{(b)}$ and we have shown that $[\tau, \bar{\tau}] \subseteq B^{(c)}$. Hence we may write $[0, 1] = \bigcup_{n} T_{n}$ as a countable union of closed intervals $T_{n}$ such that any pair of intervals intersects at most at their endpoints, and each interval $T_{n}$ is a subset of $B^{(c)}$ for some $c$. For each $T_{n}$ fix some $c(n) = c$ so that $T_{n} \subseteq B^{(c)}$. Intuitively, this means that at any time $\tau \in T_{n}$ it holds that $\gamma(g^{(c(n))}(\tau))$ is dominated by $\tilde{\gamma}(\tau)$ via school $c(n)$.

We now construct a function $g$ that satisfies the required properties as follows. If $\tau \in T_{n} \subseteq B^{(i)}$, let $g^{(\tau)} = g^{(c)}(\tau)$. Now $g$ is well-defined despite the possibility that $T_{n} \cap T_{m} \neq \emptyset$. This is because if $\tau$ is in two different intervals $T_{n}, T_{m}$, then $\gamma^{(c(n))}(g^{(c(n))}(\tau)) = \tilde{\gamma}^{(c(n))}(\tau) \geq \gamma^{(c(m))}(g^{(c(m))}(\tau))$ (by domination via $c(n)$ and $c(m)$ respectively), and $\gamma^{(c(m))}(g^{(c(m))}(\tau)) = \tilde{\gamma}^{(c(m))}(\tau) \geq \gamma^{(c(n))}(g^{(c(n))}(\tau))$ (by domination via $c(m)$ and $c(n)$ respectively), and so $g^{(c(n))}(\tau) \leq g^{(c(m))}(\tau) \leq g^{(c(n))}(\tau)$ and we can pick one value for $g$ that satisfies all required properties. Now by definition $\gamma(g^{(\tau)})$ is dominated by $\tilde{\gamma}(\tau)$ via school $c(\tau) = c(n)$, and moreover $g$ is defined on all of $[0, 1]$ since $\cup_{c \in C} B^{(c)} = [0, 1]$. This completes the proof. \hfill \Box

**Lemma 5.** Let $C \subseteq C$ be a set of schools, and let $D$ be a region on which $\tilde{H}^{C}(x)$ is irreducible for all $x \in D$. For each $x$ let $A(x)$ be given by replacing the $n$th column of $\tilde{H}^{C}(x) - I_{C}$ with the all ones vector $1$.\textsuperscript{41} Then the function $f(x) = $

\textsuperscript{41}$I_{C}$ is the identity matrix with rows and columns indexed by the elements in $C$.\n
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$[0,0,\ldots,0,-1] A(x)^{-1}$ is piecewise Lipschitz continuous in $x$.

Proof. It suffices to show that the function which, for each $x$, outputs the matrix $A(x)^{-1}$ is piecewise Lipschitz continuous in $x$.

Now

$$H_{b,c}^{d}(x) = \lim_{\epsilon \to 0} \frac{1}{\epsilon} \int_{\theta: r^{d} \neq x, r^{d} \geq x + \epsilon, b, c \geq x_{c}} \nu(\theta) d\theta,$$

where $\nu(\cdot)$ is bounded below on its support and piecewise Lipschitz continuous, and the points of discontinuity lie on the grid. Hence $H_{b,c}^{d}(x)$ is Lipschitz continuous in $x$ for all $b, c$, and $\sum_{d} H_{c}^{d}(x)$ nonzero and hence bounded below, and so $\tilde{H}^{c}(x)_{b,c}$ is bounded above and piecewise Lipschitz continuous in $x$, and therefore so is $A(x)$. Finally, since $\tilde{H}^{c}(x)$ is an irreducible row stochastic matrix for each $x \in D$, it follows that $A(x)$ is full rank and continuous. This is because when $\tilde{H}^{c}(x)$ is irreducible every choice of $n-1$ columns of $\tilde{H}^{c}(x) - I_{C}$ gives an independent set whose span does not contain the all ones vector $1_{C}$. Therefore if we let $A(x)$ be given by replacing the $n$th column in $\tilde{H}^{c}(x) - I_{C}$ with $1_{C}$, then $A(x)$ has full rank.

Since $A(x)$ is full rank and continuous, in each piece $det(A(x))$ is bounded away from 0, and so $A(x)^{-1}$ is piecewise Lipschitz continuous, as required.

D.3 Connection to Continuous Time Markov Chains

In this section, we formalize the intuition from Appendix A.3. In Appendix A.3, we appealed to a connection with Markov chain theory to provide a method for solving for all the possible values of $d(x)$. Specifically, we constructed a continuous time Markov chain with state space $C$ and transition rates from state $b$ to $c$ equal to $H_{b,c}^{d}(x)$. We argued that if $K(x)$ is the set of recurrent communication classes of this Markov chain, then the set of valid directions $d(x)$ is identical to the set of convex combinations of $\{d^{K}\}_{K \in K(x)}$, where $d^{K}$ is the unique solution to the trade balance equations (2) restricted to $K$. We present the relevant definitions, results and proofs here in full.

Let us first present some definitions from Markov chain theory.\textsuperscript{42} A square matrix $P$ is a right-stochastic matrix if all the entries are non-negative and each row sums to 1. A probability vector is a vector with non-negative entries that add up to 1. Given a right-stochastic matrix $P$, the Markov chain with transition matrix $P$ is the Markov chain with state space equal to the column/row indices of $P$, and a probability $P_{ij}$ of

\textsuperscript{42}See standard texts such as Karlin & Taylor (1975) for a more complete treatment.
moving to state \( j \) in one time step, given that we start in state \( i \). Given two states \( i, j \) of a Markov chain with transition matrix \( P \), we say that states \( i \) and \( j \) communicate if there is a positive probability of moving to state \( i \) to state \( j \) in finite time, and vice versa.

For each Markov chain, there exists a unique decomposition of the state space into a sequence of disjoint subsets \( C_1, C_2, \ldots \) such that for all \( i,j \), states \( i \) and \( j \) communicate if and only if they are in the same subset \( C_k \) for some \( k \). Each subset \( C_k \) is called a communication class of the Markov chain. A Markov chain is irreducible if it only has one communication class. A state \( i \) is recurrent if, starting at \( i \) and following the transition matrix \( P \), the probability of returning to state \( i \) is 1. A communication class is recurrent if it contains a recurrent state.

The following proposition gives a characterization of the stationary distributions of a Markov chain. We refer the reader to any standard stochastic processes textbook (e.g. Karlin & Taylor (1975)) for a proof of this result.

**Proposition 10.** Suppose that \( P \) is the transition matrix of a Markov chain. Let \( K \) be the set of recurrent communication classes of the Markov chain with transition matrix \( P \). Then for each recurrent communication class \( K \in K \), the equation \( \pi = \pi P \) has a unique solution \( \pi^K \) such that \( ||\pi^K|| = 1 \) and \( \text{supp}(\pi^K) \subseteq K \). Moreover, the support of \( \pi^K \) is equal to \( K \). In addition, if \( ||\pi|| = 1 \) and \( \pi \) is a solution to the equation \( \pi = \pi P \), then \( \pi \) is a convex combination of the vectors in \( \{\pi^K\}_{K\in K} \).

To make use of this proposition, define at each point \( x \) and for each set of schools \( C \) a Markov chain \( M^C(x) \) with transition matrix \( \tilde{H}^C(x) \). Note that this is equivalent to taking the embedded discrete-time Markov chain of a continuous-time Markov chain with transition rates \( H^C_b(x) \) for \( b \neq c \), and transition rates \( H^C_c(x) = \bar{v} \) (where \( \bar{v} \geq \max_{c\in C} \left( \sum_{d\in C} H^C_d(x) \right) \) is the normalization term used to construct \( \tilde{H}^C(x) \)).

We will relate the valid directions \( d(x) \) to the recurrent communication classes of \( M^C(x) \), where \( C \) is the set of available schools. We will need the following notation and definitions. Given a vector \( v \) indexed by \( C \), a matrix \( Q \) with rows and columns indexed by \( C \) and subsets \( K, K' \subseteq C \) of the indices, we let \( v_K \) denote the restriction of \( v \) to the coordinates in \( K \), and we let \( Q_{K,K'} \) denote the restriction of \( Q \) to rows indexed by \( K \) and columns indexed by \( K' \).

The following lemma characterizes the recurrent communication classes of the Markov chain \( M^C(x) \) using the properties of the matrix \( \tilde{H}^C(x) \), and can be found in any standard stochastic processes text.
Lemma 6. Let $C$ be the set of available school at a point $x$. Then a set $K \subseteq C$ is a recurrent communication class of the Markov chain $M^C(x)$ if and only if $\tilde{H}^C(x)_{K,K}$ is irreducible and $\tilde{H}^C(x)_{K,C\setminus K}$ is the zero matrix.

It is easy to see that the same result holds when we replace $\tilde{H}^C$ by $H^C$.

The following lemma allows us to characterize the valid directions $d$ in terms of the matrix $\tilde{H}^C(x)$.

Lemma 7. The vector $d$ is a valid direction at $x$ with available schools $C$ if and only if
\[ d \cdot 1 = -1 \text{ and } d = d \cdot \tilde{H}^C(x). \]

Proof. It suffices to show that $d = d \cdot \tilde{H}^C(x)$ if and only if
\[ \sum_{a \in C} d_a \cdot H^C_a(x) = \sum_{a \in C} d_c \cdot H^C_c(x) \quad \forall c \in C. \]

Now
\[
\begin{align*}
d &= d \cdot \tilde{H}^C(x) \\
\iff &d_c = \sum_{a \in C} d_a \cdot \tilde{H}^C_a(x) \quad \forall c \in C \\
\iff &d_c = \sum_{a \in C} d_a \cdot \left( \frac{1}{v} H^C_a(x) + 1_{a = c} \left( 1 - \frac{v_c}{v} \right) \right) \quad \forall c \in C \\
\iff &d_c \cdot \frac{v_c}{v} = \sum_{a \in C} d_a \cdot \left( \frac{1}{v} H^C_a(x) \right) \quad \forall c \in C \\
\iff &d_c \cdot \sum_{a \in C} H^C_a(x) = \sum_{a \in C} d_a \cdot H^C_a(x) \quad \forall c \in C
\end{align*}
\]
which concludes the proof. \hfill \square

Proposition 10 and Lemmas 7 and 6 allow us to characterize the valid directions $d(x)$.

Theorem 4. Let $C$ be the set of available schools, and let $\mathcal{K}(x)$ be the set of subsets $K \subseteq C$ for which $\tilde{H}^C(x)_{K,K}$ is irreducible and $\tilde{H}^C(x)_{K,C\setminus K}$ is the zero matrix. Then for each $K \in \mathcal{K}(x)$ the equation $d = d \cdot \tilde{H}^C(x)_{K}$ has a unique solution $d^K$ that satisfies $d^K \cdot 1 = -1$ and $\text{supp}(d^K) \subseteq K$, and its projection onto its support $K$ has the form
\[ (d^K)_K = [0, 0, \ldots, 0, -1] A^C_K(x)^{-1}, \]
where $A_K^C(x)$ is the matrix obtained by replacing the $(|K| - 1)$th column of $\tilde{H}^C(x)_{K,K} - I_K$ with the all ones vector $1_K$.

Moreover, if $d \cdot 1 = -1$ and $d$ is a solution to the equation $d = d \cdot \tilde{H}^C(x)$, then $d$ is a convex combination of the vectors in $\{d^K\}_{K \in \mathcal{K}(x)}$.

**Proof.** Proposition 6 shows that the sets $K$ are precisely the recurrent sets of the Markov chain with transition matrix $\tilde{H}^C(x)$. Hence uniqueness of the $d^K$ and the fact that $d$ is a convex combination of $d^K$ follow directly from Proposition 10. The form of the solution $d^K$ follows from Lemma 2.

This has the following interpretation. Suppose that there is a unique recurrent communication class $K$, such as when $\eta$ has full support. Then there is a unique infinitesimal continuum trading cycle of students, specified by the unique valid direction $d$ satisfying $d = d \cdot \tilde{H}(x)$. Moreover, students in the cycle trade seats from every school in $K$. Any school not in $K$ is blocked from participating, since there is not enough demand to fill the seats they are offering. When there are multiple recurrent communication classes, each of the $d^K$ gives a unique infinitesimal trading cycle of students, corresponding to those who trade seats in $K$. Moreover, these trading cycles are disjoint. Hence the only multiplicity that remains is to decide the order, or the relative rate, at which to clear these cycles. We will show in Appendix D.4 that, as in the discrete setting, the order in which cycles are cleared does not affect the final allocation.

**D.4 Proof of Theorem 2**

We first show that there exist solutions $p, \gamma, t$ to the marginal trade balance equations and capacity equations. The proof relies on selecting appropriate valid directions $d(x)$ and then invoking the Picard-Lindelöf theorem to show existence.

Specifically, let $C$ be the set of available schools, fix a point $x$, and consider the set of vectors $d$ such that $d \cdot \tilde{H}^C(x) = d$. Then it follows from Theorem 4 that if $d(x)$ is the valid direction from $x$ with minimal support under the shortlex order, then $d(x) = d^K(x)$ for the element $K(x) \in \mathcal{K}(x)$ that is the smallest under the shortlex ordering.\textsuperscript{43} As the density $\nu(\cdot)$ defining $\eta(\cdot)$ is Lipschitz continuous, it follows that $\mathcal{K}(\cdot)$ and $K(\cdot)$ are piecewise constant. Hence we may invoke Lemma 5 and the form of $d(\cdot)$ as given in Lemma 2 to conclude that $d(\cdot)$ is piecewise

\textsuperscript{43}We choose the shortlex ordering to ensure that we choose valid directions corresponding to a single recurrent communication class, rather than unions of recurrent communication classes.
Lipschitz within each piece, and hence piecewise Lipschitz in $[0, 1]^C$. Since $d(\cdot)$ is piecewise Lipschitz, it follows from the Picard-Lindelöf theorem that there exists a unique function $\gamma(\cdot)$ satisfying $\frac{d\gamma(t)}{dt} = d(\gamma(t))$. It follows trivially that $\gamma$ satisfies the marginal trade balance equations, and since we have assumed that all students find all schools acceptable and there are more students than seats it follows that there exist stopping times $t^c(x)$ and cutoffs $p_h^c$.

**Proof of the Uniqueness of the TTC Allocation**

In this section, we prove the uniqueness claim in Theorem 2, that any two valid TTC paths give equivalent allocations. The intuition for the result is the following. The connection to Markov chains shows that having multiple possible valid directions in the continuum corresponds to having multiple possible trade cycles in the discrete model. Hence the only multiplicity in choosing valid TTC directions is whether to implement one set of trades before the others, or to implement them in parallel at various relative rates. We can show that the set of cycles is independent of the order in which cycles are selected, or equivalently that the sets of students who trade with each other is independent of the order in which possible trades are executed. It follows that any pair of valid TTC paths give the same final allocation.

We remark that the crux of the argument is similar to what shows that discrete TTC gives a unique allocation. However, the lack of discrete cycles and the ability to implement sets of trades in parallel both complicate the argument and lead to a rather technical proof.

We first formally define cycles in the continuum setting, and a partial order over the cycles corresponding to the order in which cycles can be cleared under TTC. We then define the set of cycles $\Sigma(\gamma)$ associated with a valid TTC path $\gamma$. Finally, we show that the sets of cycles associated with two valid TTC paths $\gamma$ and $\gamma'$ are the same, $\Sigma(\gamma) = \Sigma(\gamma')$.

**Definition 5.** A (continuum) cycle $\sigma = (K, \underline{x}, \overline{x})$ is a set $K \subseteq C$ and a pair of vectors $\underline{x} \leq \overline{x}$ in $[0, 1]^C$. The cycle $\sigma$ is valid for available schools $\{C(x)\}_{x \in [0, 1]^C}$ if $K \in K_{C(x)}(x) \forall x \in (\underline{x}, \overline{x})$.

Intuitively, a cycle is defined by two time points in a run of TTC, which gives a set of students,\(^{44}\) and the set of schools they most desire. A cycle is valid if the set of

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\(^{44}\)The set of students is given by taking the difference between two nested hyperrectangles, one with upper coordinate $\overline{x}$ and the other with upper coordinate $\underline{x}$.
schools involved is a recurrent communication class of the associated Markov chains.\textsuperscript{45} We say that a cycle \( \sigma = (K, x, \pi) \) appears at time \( t \) in \( TTC(\gamma) \) if \( K \in \mathcal{K}^{C(\gamma(t))}(\gamma(t)) \) and \( \gamma_c(t) = \pi_c \) for all \( c \in K \). We say that a student \( \theta \) is in cycle \( \sigma \) if \( r^\theta \in (x, \pi) \)\textsuperscript{46}, and a school \( c \) is in cycle \( \sigma \) if \( c \in K \).

**Definition 6** (Partial order over cycles). The cycle \( \sigma = (K, x, \pi) \) blocks the cycle \( \sigma' = (K', x', \pi') \), denoted by \( \sigma \triangleright \sigma' \), if at least one of the following hold:

(Blocking student) There exists a student \( \theta \) in \( \sigma' \) who prefers a school in \( K \) to all those in \( K' \), i.e. there exist \( \theta \) and \( c \in K \setminus K' \) such that \( c \succ^\theta c' \) for all \( c' \in K' \).

(Blocking school) There exists a school in \( \sigma' \) that prefers a positive measure of students in \( \sigma \) to all those in \( \sigma' \), i.e. there exists \( c \in K' \) such that \( \eta(\theta \mid \sigma, r^\theta_c > \pi'_c) > 0 \).\textsuperscript{47}

Let us now define the set of cycles associated with a run of \( TTC \). We begin with some observations about \( H_{bc}^{\cdot C_1}(\cdot) \) and \( \tilde{H}^C(\cdot)_{bc} \). For all \( b, c \in C \) the function \( H_{bc}^{\cdot C_1}(\cdot) \) is right-continuous on \([0, 1]^C\), Lipschitz continuous on \( R \) for all \( R \in \mathcal{R} \) and uniformly bounded away from zero on its support. Hence \( 1(\tilde{H}_{bc}^{\cdot C_1}(\cdot)) \) is constant on \( R \) for all \( R \in \mathcal{R} \). It follows that \( \tilde{H}^C(\cdot)_{bc} \) is also right-continuous, and Lipschitz continuous on \( R \) for all \( R \in \mathcal{R} \). Moreover, there exists some finite rectangular subpartition \( \mathcal{R}' \) of \( \mathcal{R} \) such that for all \( C \subseteq C \) the function \( 1(\tilde{H}^C(\cdot)) \) is constant on \( R \) for all \( R \in \mathcal{R}' \).

**Definition 7.** Let \( \mathcal{R}' \) denote the minimal rectangular subpartition of \( \mathcal{R} \) such that for all \( C \subseteq C \) the function \( 1(\tilde{H}^C(\cdot)) \) is constant on \( R \) for all \( R \in \mathcal{R}' \).

For \( x \in [0, 1]^C \) and \( C \subseteq C \), let \( \mathcal{K}^C(x) \) be the recurrent communication classes of the Markov chain \( M^C(x) \). The following lemma follows immediately from Proposition 6, since \( 1(\tilde{H}^C(\cdot)) \) is constant on \( R \forall R \in \mathcal{R}' \), and recurrent communication classes depend only on \( 1(\tilde{H}^C) \).

**Lemma 8.** \( \mathcal{K}^C(\cdot) \) is constant on \( R \) for every \( R \in \mathcal{R}' \).

For each \( K \in \mathcal{K}^C(x) \), let \( d^K(x) \) be the unique vector satisfying \( d = d\tilde{H}^C(x) \), which exists by Theorem 4.

\textsuperscript{45}Note that we consider validity only in terms of whether the schools are the appropriate schools for a trading cycle, and not in terms of the feasibility of trade balance for the students in the cycle.

\textsuperscript{46}Recall that since \( r^\theta, x \) and \( \pi \) are vectors, this is equivalent to saying that \( r^\theta \leq x \) and \( r^\theta \leq \pi \).

\textsuperscript{47}For \( c \) to block the cycle \( \sigma \) it is necessary but not sufficient that \( \pi_c > \pi'_c \), since there also need to be students in \( \sigma \) with the intermediate ranks at school \( c \).
Let $\gamma$ be a TTC path, and assume that the schools are labeled in order. It follows that for all $x$ there exists $\ell$ such that $C(x) = C^{(\ell)} \eqdef \{\ell, \ell + 1, \ldots, |C|\}$. For each set of schools $K \subseteq C$, let $T^{(\ell)}(K, \gamma)$ be the set of times $\tau$ such that $C(\gamma(\tau)) = C^{(\ell)}$ and $K$ is a recurrent communication class for $\bar{H}^{C^{(\ell)}}(\gamma(\tau))$. Since $\gamma$ is continuous and weakly decreasing, it follows from Lemma 8 that $T^{(\ell)}(K, \gamma)$ is the finite disjoint union of intervals of the form $[t, \bar{t}]$. Let $\mathcal{I}(T^{(\ell)}(K, \gamma))$ denote the set of intervals in this disjoint union. We may assume that for each interval $T$, $\gamma(T)$ is contained in some hyperrectangle $R \in \mathcal{R}$.\footnote{This is without loss of generality, since if $\gamma(T)$ is not contained we can simply partition $T$ into a finite number of intervals $\cup_{R \in \mathcal{R}} \gamma^{-1}(\gamma(T) \cap R)$, each contained in a hyperrectangle in $\mathcal{R}$.}

For a time interval $T = [\underline{t}, \bar{t}] \in \mathcal{I}(T^{(\ell)}(K, \gamma))$, we define the cycle $\sigma(T) = (K, x(T), \bar{x}(T))$ as follows. Intuitively, we want to define it simply as $\sigma(T) = (K, \gamma(\underline{t}), \gamma(\bar{t}))$, but in order to minimize the dependence on $\gamma$, we define the endpoints $x(T)$ and $\bar{x}(T)$ of the interval of ranks to be as close together as possible, while still describing the same set of students (up to a set of $\eta$-measure 0). Define

$$
x(T) = \max \left\{ x : \gamma(\underline{t}) \leq x \leq \gamma(\bar{t}), \eta(\theta : Ch_\theta(C^{(\ell)}) \in K, r^\theta \in (x, \gamma(\bar{t})) = 0 \right\},
$$

$$
\bar{x}(T) = \min \left\{ x : \gamma(\underline{t}) \leq x \leq \gamma(\bar{t}), \eta(\theta : Ch_\theta(C^{(\ell)}) \in K, r^\theta \in (\gamma(\underline{t}), x] = 0 \right\},
$$

to be the points chosen to be maximal and minimal respectively such that the set of students allocated by $\gamma$ during the time interval $T$ has the same $\eta$-measure as if $\gamma(\underline{t}) = \underline{x}(\tau)$ and $\gamma(\bar{t}) = \bar{x}(\tau)$.\footnote{In order to take the maximum and minimum of the set of possible values for $\underline{x}$ and $\bar{x}$ respectively we order the elements of $[0, 1]^C$ lexicographically.} In other words, $\underline{x}(\tau)$ and $\bar{x}(\tau)$ are chosen to be respectively maximal and minimal under the lexicographical order such that

$$
\eta(\{(\cup_{K \subseteq C^{(\ell)}} T^{(\ell)}(\gamma; \bar{t}) \setminus T^{(\ell)}(\gamma; t)) \setminus \{\theta : Ch_\theta(C^{(\ell)}) \in K, r^\theta \in (\bar{x}(T), \underline{x}(T))\} = 0.
$$

In a slight abuse of notation, if $\sigma = \sigma(T)$ we will let $\underline{x}(\sigma)$ denote $\underline{x}(T)$ and $\bar{x}(\sigma)$ denote $\bar{x}(T)$.

**Definition 8.** The set of cycles cleared by TTC $(\gamma)$ in round $\ell$, denoted by $\Sigma^{(\ell)}(\gamma)$, is given by

$$
\Sigma^{(\ell)}(\gamma) := \bigcup_{K \subseteq C^{(\ell)}} \bigcup_{T \in \mathcal{I}(T^{(\ell)}(K, \gamma))} \sigma(T).
$$

The set of cycles cleared by TTC $(\gamma)$, denoted by $\Sigma(\gamma)$, is the set of cycles cleared
by \(TTC(\gamma)\) in some round \(\ell\),

\[
\Sigma(\gamma) := \bigcup_{\ell} \Sigma^{(\ell)}(\gamma).
\]

For any cycle \(\sigma \in \Sigma(\gamma)\) and time \(\tau\) we say that the cycle \(\sigma\) is clearing at time \(\tau\) if \(\gamma(\tau) \not\leq \underline{\pi}(\sigma)\) and \(\gamma(\tau) \not\geq \underline{\pi}(\sigma)\). We say that the cycle \(\sigma\) is cleared at time \(\tau\) or finishes clearing at time \(\tau\) if \(\gamma^{(0)}(\tau) \leq \underline{\pi}(\sigma)\) with at least one equality. We remark that for any TTC path \(\gamma\) there may be multiple cycles clearing at a time \(\tau\), each corresponding to a different recurrent set. For any TTC path \(\gamma\) the set \(\Sigma(\gamma)\) is finite.

Fix two TTC paths \(\gamma\) and \(\gamma'\). Our goal is to show that they clear the same sets of cycles, \(\Sigma(\gamma) = \Sigma(\gamma')\), or equivalently that \(\Sigma(\gamma) \cup \Sigma(\gamma') = \Sigma(\gamma) \cap \Sigma(\gamma')\). We will do this by showing that for every cycle \(\sigma \in \Sigma(\gamma) \cup \Sigma(\gamma')\), if all cycles in \(\Sigma(\gamma) \cup \Sigma(\gamma')\) that block \(\sigma\) are in \(\Sigma(\gamma) \cap \Sigma(\gamma')\), then \(\sigma \in \Sigma(\gamma) \cap \Sigma(\gamma')\). We first show that this is true in a special case, which can be understood intuitively as the case when the cycle \(\sigma\) appears during the run of \(TTC(\gamma)\) and also appears during the run of \(TTC(\gamma')\).

**Lemma 9.** Let \(E = (C, \Theta, \eta, q)\) be a continuum economy, and let \(\gamma\) and \(\gamma'\) be two TTC paths for this economy. Let \(K \subseteq C\) and \(\underline{t}\) be such that at time \(\underline{t}\), \(\gamma(\gamma')\) has available schools \(C\) (\(C'\)), the paths \(\gamma\), \(\gamma'\) are at the same point when projected onto the coordinates \(K\), i.e. \(\gamma(\underline{t})_K = \gamma'(\underline{t})_K\), and \(K\) is a recurrent communication class of \(M^C(\gamma(\underline{t}))\) and of \(M^{C'}(\gamma'(\underline{t}))\). Suppose that for all schools \(c \in K\) and cycles \(\sigma' \succ \sigma\) involving school \(c\), if \(\sigma' \in \Sigma(\gamma)\), then \(\sigma'\) is cleared in \(TTC(\gamma')\), and vice versa. Suppose also that cycle \(\sigma = (K, \underline{x}, \underline{\pi})\) is cleared in \(TTC(\gamma)\), \(\gamma(\underline{t}) = \underline{x}\), and measure 0 of \(\sigma\) has been cleared by time \(\underline{t}\) in \(TTC(\gamma')\). Then \(\sigma\) is also cleared in \(TTC(\gamma')\).

**Proof.** We define the ‘interior’ of the cycle \(\sigma\) by \(X = \{x : x_c \leq x \leq \pi_c \forall c \in K, x_{c'} \geq \pi_c \forall c' \notin K\}\). Fix a time \(u\) such that \(\gamma'(u) \in X\) and let \(D'\) denote the set of available schools at time \(u\) in \(TTC(\gamma')\). Then we claim that \(K\) is a recurrent communication class of \(M^{D'}(\gamma'(u))\), and that a similar result is true for \(\gamma\) and a similarly defined \(D\). The claim for \(\gamma, D\) follows from the fact that \(\sigma\) is cleared in \(TTC(\gamma), \sigma \in \Sigma(\gamma)\). It remains to show that the claim for \(\gamma', D'\) is true. Formally, by Lemma 6 it suffices to show that \(\tilde{H}^{D'}(x)_{K,K}\) is irreducible and \(\tilde{H}^{D'}(x)_{K,D' \setminus K}\) is the zero matrix.

We first examine the differences between the matrices \(\tilde{H}^{C'}(\gamma'(t))\) and \(\tilde{H}^{D'}(\gamma'(u))\). Since \(K\) is a recurrent communication class of \(M^{C'}(\gamma'(u))\), it holds that there are no transitions from \(K\) to states outside of \(K\), i.e. \(\mathbf{1}(\tilde{H}^{C'}(\gamma'(u))_{K, C' \setminus K}) = 0\).
Since $K \subseteq D' \subseteq C'$ it follows that $\mathbf{1}\left( \tilde{H}^{D'} (\gamma'(u))_{K,D' \setminus K} \right) = 0$. Moreover, since $\mathbf{1}\left( \tilde{H}^{C'} (\gamma'(u))_{K,C' \setminus K} \right) = 0$, all students’ top choice schools out of $C'$ or $D'$ are the same (in $K$), and so $\tilde{H}^{C'} (\gamma'(u))_{K,K} = \tilde{H}^{D'} (\gamma'(u))_{K,K}$ and both matrices are irreducible. Hence $K$ is a recurrent communication class of $M^{D'} (\gamma'(u))$.

We now invoke Theorem 4 to show that in each of the two paths, all the students in the cycle $\sigma$ clear with each other. Specifically, while the path $\gamma$ is in the ‘interior’ of the cycle, that is $\gamma (\tau) \in X$, it follows from Theorem 4 that the projection of the gradient of $\gamma$ to $K$ is a rescaling of some vector $d^K (\gamma (\tau))$, where $d^K (\cdot)$ depends on $\tilde{H} (\cdot)$ but not on $\gamma$. Similarly, while $\gamma' (\tau') \in X$, it holds that the projection of the gradient of $\gamma'$ to $K$ is a rescaling of the vector $d^K (\gamma'(\tau'))$, for the same function $d^K (\cdot)$. Hence if we let $\pi_K (x)$ denote the projection of a vector $x$ to the coordinates indexed by schools in $K$, then $\pi_K (\gamma (\gamma^{-1} ((x, \overline{x})))) = \pi_K (\gamma' (\gamma'^{-1} ((x, \overline{x}))))$.

Recall that we have assumed that for all schools $c \in K$ and cycles $\sigma' \triangleright \sigma$ involving school $c$, if $\sigma' \in \Sigma (\gamma)$, then $\sigma'$ is cleared in $TTC (\gamma')$, and vice versa. This implies that for all $c \in K$, the measure of students assigned to $c$ in time $[0, 1]$ under $TTC (\gamma)$ is the same as the measure of students assigned to $c$ in time $[0, 1]$ under $TTC (\gamma')$. Moreover, we have just shown that for any $x \in \gamma (\gamma^{-1} ((x, \overline{x})))$, $x' \in \gamma' (\gamma'^{-1} ((x, \overline{x})))$ such that $x_K = x'_K$, if we let $\tau = \gamma^{-1} (x)$ and $\tau' = (\gamma')^{-1} (x')$ then the same measure of students are assigned to $c$ in time $[L, \tau]$ under $TTC (\gamma)$ as in time $[L, \tau']$ under $TTC (\gamma')$. Since $TTC (\gamma)$ clears $\sigma$ the moment it exits the interior of $\sigma$, this implies that $TTC (\gamma')$ also clears $\sigma$ the moment it exits the interior.

We are now ready to prove that the TTC allocation is unique. As the proof takes several steps, we separate it into several smaller claims for readability.

**Proof of uniqueness.** Let $\gamma$ and $\gamma'$ be two TTC paths, and let the sets of cycles associated with $TTC (\gamma)$ and $TTC (\gamma')$ be $\Sigma = \Sigma (\gamma)$ and $\Sigma' = \Sigma (\gamma')$ respectively. We will show that $\Sigma = \Sigma'$.

Let $\sigma = (K, \overline{x}, \overline{\pi})$ be a cycle in $\Sigma \cup \Sigma'$ such that the following assumption holds:

**Assumption 2.** For all $\tilde{\sigma} \triangleright \sigma$ it holds that either $\tilde{\sigma}$ is in both $\Sigma$ and $\Sigma'$ or $\tilde{\sigma}$ is in neither.

We show that if $\sigma$ is in $\Sigma \cup \Sigma'$ then it is in $\Sigma \cap \Sigma'$. Since $\Sigma$ and $\Sigma'$ are finite sets, this will be sufficient to show that $\Sigma = \Sigma'$. Without loss of generality we may assume that $\sigma \in \Sigma$.  

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We give here an overview of the proof. Let \( \Sigma_\sigma = \{ \tilde{\sigma} \in \Sigma : \tilde{\sigma} \triangleright \sigma \} \) denote the set of cycles that are comparable to \( \sigma \) and cleared before \( \sigma \) in \( \text{TTC}(\gamma) \). Assumption 2 about \( \sigma \) implies that \( \Sigma_\sigma \subseteq \Sigma' \). We will show that this implies that no students in \( \sigma \) start clearing under \( \text{TTC}(\gamma') \) until all the students in \( \sigma \) have the same top available school in \( \text{TTC}(\gamma') \) as when they clear in \( \text{TTC}(\gamma) \), or in other words, that if some students in \( \sigma \) start clearing under \( \text{TTC}(\gamma') \) at time \( t \), then the cycle \( \sigma \) appears at time \( t \). We will then show that once some of the students in \( \sigma \) start clearing under \( \text{TTC}(\gamma') \) then all of them start clearing. It then follows from Lemma 9 that \( \sigma \) clears under both \( \text{TTC}(\gamma) \) and \( \text{TTC}(\gamma') \).

Let \( \ell \) denote the round of \( \text{TTC}(\gamma) \) in which \( \sigma \) is cleared, \( C(x) = C^{(t)} \forall x \in \sigma \). We define the times in \( \text{TTC}(\gamma) \) and \( \text{TTC}(\gamma') \) when all the cycles in \( \Sigma_\sigma \) are cleared, by

\[
\begin{align*}
\tilde{t}_\sigma &= \min \left\{ t : \gamma(t) \leq (\bar{x}) \text{ for all } \tilde{\sigma} = \left( \tilde{K}, \tilde{\bar{x}}, (\tilde{\pi}) \right) \in \Sigma_{\tilde{\sigma}} \text{ and } \tilde{H}(\gamma(t)) \neq 0 \right\}, \\
\bar{t}_\sigma &= \min \left\{ t : \gamma'(t) \leq (\bar{x}) \text{ for all } \tilde{\sigma} = \left( \tilde{K}, \tilde{\bar{x}}, (\tilde{\pi}) \right) \in \Sigma_{\tilde{\sigma}} \text{ and } \tilde{H}(\gamma'(t)) \neq 0 \right\}.
\end{align*}
\]

We define also the times in \( \text{TTC}(\gamma) \) when \( \sigma \) starts to be cleared and finishes clearing,

\[
\begin{align*}
t_\sigma &= \max \left\{ t : \gamma(t) \geq \bar{x} \right\}, \\
\bar{t}_\sigma &= \min \left\{ t : \gamma(t) \leq \bar{x} \right\}
\end{align*}
\]

and similarly define the times \( \tilde{t}_\sigma = \max \left\{ t : \gamma'(t) \geq \bar{x} \right\}, \quad \bar{t}_\sigma = \min \left\{ t : \gamma'(t) \leq \bar{x} \right\} \) for \( \text{TTC}(\gamma') \).

We remark that part of the issue, carried over from the discrete setting, is that these times \( \tilde{t}_\sigma \) and \( \bar{t}_\sigma \) might not match up, and similarly for \( \tilde{t}_\sigma' \) and \( \bar{t}_\sigma' \). In particular, other incomparable cycles could clear at interwoven times. In the continuum model, there may also be sections on the \( \text{TTC} \) curve at which no school is pointing to a positive density of students. However, all the issues in the continuum case can be addressed using the intuition from the discrete case.

We first show in Claims (1), (2) and (3) that in both \( \text{TTC}(\gamma) \) and \( \text{TTC}(\gamma') \), after all the cycles in \( \Sigma_{\tilde{\sigma}} \) are cleared and before \( \sigma \) starts to be cleared, the schools pointed to by students in \( \sigma \) and the students pointed to by schools in \( K \) remain constant (up to a set of \( \eta \)-measure 0).

**Claim 1.** Let \( \sigma = (K, x, \pi) \in \Sigma \) satisfy Assumption 2. Suppose there is a school \( c \) that some student in \( \sigma \) prefers to all the schools in \( K \). Then school \( c \) is unavailable in \( \text{TTC}(\gamma) \) at any time \( t \geq \tilde{t}_\sigma \), and unavailable in \( \text{TTC}(\gamma') \) at any time \( t \geq \bar{t}_\sigma' \).

**Proof.** Suppose that school \( c \) is available in \( \text{TTC}(\gamma) \) after all the cycles in \( \Sigma_{\tilde{\sigma}} \) are
cleared. Then there exists a cycle $\tilde{\sigma}$ clearing at time $\tilde{t} \in (\tilde{t}_{c, \sigma}, \tilde{t}_\sigma)$ in $\text{TTC}(\gamma)$ involving school $c$. But this means that $\tilde{\sigma} \succ \sigma$ so $\tilde{\sigma} \in \Sigma_{\succ \sigma}$, which is a contradiction. Hence the measure of students in $\Sigma_{\succ \sigma}$ who are assigned to school $c$ is $q_c$, and the claim follows.

**Claim 2.** In $\text{TTC}(\gamma)$, let $\tilde{\Theta}$ denote the set of students cleared in time $[\tilde{t}_{c, \sigma}, \tilde{t}_\sigma]$ who are preferred by some school in $c \in K$ to the students in $\sigma$, that is, $\theta$ satisfying $r^\theta_c > \tilde{x}_c$. Then $\eta(\tilde{\Theta}) = 0$.

**Proof.** Suppose $\eta(\tilde{\Theta}) > 0$. Then, since there are a finite number of cycles in $\Sigma(\gamma)$, there exists some cycle $\tilde{\sigma} = (\tilde{K}, \tilde{x}, (\tilde{x})) \in \Sigma(\gamma)$ containing a positive $\eta$-measure of students in $\tilde{\Theta}$. We show that $\tilde{\sigma}$ is cleared before $\sigma$. Since $\tilde{\sigma}$ contains a positive $\eta$-measure of students in $\tilde{\Theta}$, it holds that there exist $t_1, t_2 \in [\tilde{t}_{c, \sigma}, \tilde{t}_\sigma)$ and a school $c \in K$ for which $\tilde{x}_c \leq \gamma(t_1)_c < \gamma(t_2)_c \leq (\tilde{x})_c$. Hence $x_c \leq \gamma(t'_\sigma)_c \leq \gamma(t'_\sigma)_c < \gamma(t'_\sigma)_c \leq \tilde{x}_c$, so $\tilde{\sigma} \succ \sigma$ as claimed. But by the definition of $t_1, t_2$ it holds that $(\tilde{x})_c \leq \gamma(t_1)_c < \gamma(t_2)_c \leq \gamma(t'_\sigma)_c$, so $\tilde{\sigma}$ is not cleared before $\tilde{t}_{c, \sigma}$, contradicting the definition of $\tilde{t}_{c, \sigma}$.

**Claim 3.** In $\text{TTC}(\gamma')$, let $\tilde{\Theta}$ denote the set of students cleared in time $[\tilde{t}'_{c, \sigma}, \tilde{t}'_\sigma]$ who are preferred by some school in $c \in K$ to the students in $\sigma$, that is, $\theta$ satisfying $r^\theta_c > \tilde{x}_c$. Then $\eta(\tilde{\Theta}) = 0$.

**Proof.** Suppose $\eta(\tilde{\Theta}) > 0$. Then, since there are a finite number of cycles in $\Sigma(\gamma')$, there exists some cycle $\tilde{\sigma} = (\tilde{K}, \tilde{x}, (\tilde{x})) \in \Sigma(\gamma')$ containing a positive $\eta$-measure of students in $\tilde{\Theta}$. We show that $\tilde{\sigma}$ is cleared before $\sigma$. Since $\tilde{\sigma}$ contains a positive $\eta$-measure of students in $\tilde{\Theta}$, it holds that there exist $t_1, t_2 \in [\tilde{t}'_{c, \sigma}, \tilde{t}'_\sigma)$ for which $\tilde{x}_c \leq \gamma'(t_1)_c < \gamma'(t_2)_c \leq (\tilde{x})_c$. Hence $x_c \leq \gamma'(t'_\sigma)_c \leq \gamma'(t'_\sigma)_c < \gamma'(t'_\sigma)_c \leq \tilde{x}_c$, so $\tilde{\sigma} \succ \sigma$ and must be cleared before $\sigma$. Moreover, $(\tilde{x})_c \leq \gamma'(t_1)_c < \gamma'(t_2)_c \leq \gamma(t'_\sigma)_c$, so it follows from the definition of $\tilde{t}'_{c, \sigma}$ that $\tilde{\sigma} \not\in \Sigma_{\succ \sigma}$, but since we assumed that $\tilde{\sigma} \in \Sigma'$ it follows that $\tilde{\sigma} \in \Sigma' \setminus \Sigma$, contradicting assumption 2 on $\sigma$.

We now show in Claims (4) and (5) that in both $\text{TTC}(\gamma)$ and $\text{TTC}(\gamma')$ the cycle $\sigma$ starts clearing when students in the cycle $\sigma$ start clearing. We formalize this in the continuum model by considering the coordinates of the paths $\gamma, \gamma'$ at the time $t_\sigma$ when the cycle $\sigma$ starts clearing, and showing that, for all coordinates indexed by schools in $K$, this is equal to $\tilde{x}$.

**Claim 4.** $\gamma_K(t_\sigma) = \tilde{x}_K$. 

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Proof. The definition of $T_c$ implies that $\gamma(T_c)_c \geq \bar{x}_c$ for all $c \in K$. Suppose there exists $c \in K$ such that $\gamma(T_c)_c > \bar{x}_c$. Since $\sigma$ starts clearing at time $T_c$, for all $\varepsilon > 0$ school $c$ must point to a non-zero measure of students in $\sigma$ over the time period $[T_c, T_c + \varepsilon]$, whose scores $r^\theta_c$ satisfy $\gamma(T_c)_c \geq r^\theta_c \geq \gamma(T_c + \varepsilon)_c$. For sufficiently small $\varepsilon$ the continuity of $\gamma(\cdot)$ and the assumption that $\gamma(T_c)_c > \bar{x}_c$ implies that $r^\theta_c \geq \gamma(T_c + \varepsilon)_c > \bar{x}_c$, which contradicts the definition of $\bar{x}_c$. \hfill \Box

Claim 5. $\gamma_K'(T'_c) = \bar{x}_K$.

As in the proof of Claim (4), the definition of $T'_c$ implies that $\gamma'(T'_c)_c \geq \bar{x}_c = \gamma(T_c)_c$ for all $c \in K$. Since we cannot assume that $\sigma$ is the cycle that is being cleared at time $T'_c$ in $TTC(\gamma')$, the proof of Claim (5) is more complicated than that of the Claim (4) and takes several steps.

We rely on the fact that $K$ is a recurrent communication class in $TTC(\gamma)$, and that all cycles comparable to $\sigma$ are already cleared in $TTC(\gamma')$. The underlying concept is very simple in the discrete model, but is complicated in the continuum by the definition of the TTC path in terms of specific points, as opposed to measures of students, and the need to account for sets of students of $\eta$-measure 0.

Let $K_\geq$ be the set of coordinates in $K$ at which equality holds, $\gamma'(T'_c)_c = \gamma(T_c)_c$, and let $K_>$ be the set of coordinates in $K$ where strict inequality holds, $\gamma'(T'_c)_c > \gamma(T_c)_c$. It suffices to show that $K_>$ is empty. We do this by showing that under $TTC(\gamma')$ at time $T'_c$, every school in $K_>$ points to a zero density of students, and some school in $K_<$ points to a non-zero density of students, and so if both sets are non-empty this contradicts the marginal trade balance equations. In what follows, let $C$ denote the set of available schools in $TTC(\gamma)$ at time $T_c$, and let $C'$ denote the set of available schools in $TTC(\gamma')$ at time $T'_c$.

Claim 6. Suppose that $c \in K_\geq$. Then there exists $\varepsilon > 0$ such that in $TTC(\gamma')$, the set of students pointed to by school $c$ in time $[T'_c, T'_c + \varepsilon]$ has $\eta$-measure 0, i.e. $H^{C'}(\gamma'(T'_c))_{cb} = 0$.

Proof. Since $c \in K_\geq$ it holds that $\gamma'(T'_c)_c > \bar{x}_c$, and since $\gamma'$ is continuous, for sufficiently small $\varepsilon$ it holds that $\gamma'(T'_c + \varepsilon)_c > \bar{x}_c$. Hence the set of students that school $c$ points to in time $[T'_c, T'_c + \varepsilon]$ is a subset of those with score $r^\theta_c$ satisfying $\gamma'(T'_c)_c \geq r^\theta_c \geq \gamma'(T'_c + \varepsilon)_c > \bar{x}_c$. By assumption 2 and Claim (3) any cycle $\tilde{\sigma}$ clearing some of these students contains at most measure 0 of them, since $\tilde{\sigma}$ is cleared after $\Sigma_{\tilde{\sigma}} \sigma$ and before $\sigma$. Since there is a finite number of such cycles the set of students has $\eta$-measure 0. \hfill \Box

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Claim 7. If \( c \in K_\to \), \( b \in K \) and \( \tilde{H}^C (\gamma (t_\sigma))_{cb} > 0 \), then \( \tilde{H}^{C'} (\gamma' (t'_\sigma))_{cb} > 0 \).

Proof. Since every \( \tilde{H}^C (\gamma' (t'_\sigma))_{cb} \) is a positive multiple of \( H^C_b (\gamma' (t'_\sigma)) \), it suffices to show that \( H^C_b (\gamma' (t'_\sigma)) > 0 \). Let \( \Sigma^- (\varepsilon) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\gamma' (t'_\sigma)) - \varepsilon \cdot e, \gamma' (t'_\sigma) \). We first show that for sufficiently small \( \varepsilon \) it holds that \( \eta^C (\Sigma^- (\varepsilon)) = \Omega (\varepsilon) \). Let \( \Sigma^- (\varepsilon) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\gamma (t_\sigma)) - \varepsilon \cdot e, \gamma (t_\sigma) \). Since \( \tilde{H}^C (\gamma (t_\sigma))_{cb} > 0 \), it follows from the definition of \( H^C_b (\cdot) \) that \( \tilde{H}^C (x) \equiv \lim_{\varepsilon \to 0} \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \eta^C (\Sigma^- (\varepsilon)) > 0 \) and hence \( \eta^C (\Sigma^- (\varepsilon)) = \Omega (\varepsilon) \) for sufficiently small \( \varepsilon \). Moreover, at most \( \eta \)-measure 0 of the students in \( \Sigma^- (\varepsilon) \) are not in the cycle \( \sigma \). Finally, \( \Sigma^- (\varepsilon) \supseteq \Sigma^- (\varepsilon) \setminus \Sigma^+(\varepsilon) \), where \( \Sigma^+ (\varepsilon) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\gamma (t_\sigma) + \varepsilon \cdot e, \gamma (t_\sigma)) \). If \( \varepsilon < \overline{x}_c - \underline{x}_c \) then \( \eta \)-measure 0 of the students in \( \Sigma^+ (\varepsilon) \) are not cleared by cycle \( \sigma \). Hence \( \eta^C (\Sigma^- (\varepsilon)) \geq \eta^C (\Sigma^- (\varepsilon)) - \eta^C (\Sigma^+ (\varepsilon)) = \Omega (\varepsilon) \).

Suppose for the sake of contradiction that \( H^C_b (\gamma' (t'_\sigma)) = \lim_{\varepsilon \to 0} \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \eta^C (\Sigma' (\varepsilon)) = 0 \), so that \( \eta^C (\Sigma' (\varepsilon)) = o (\varepsilon) \) for sufficiently small \( \varepsilon \). Then there is a school \( b' \neq b \) and type \( \theta \in \Theta^C_b \cap \Theta^C_\eta \) such that there is an \( \eta \)-measure \( \Omega (\varepsilon) \) of students in \( \sigma \) with type \( \theta \). Since \( b' \in C' \) it is available in \( TTC (\gamma') \) at time \( t'_\sigma \), and by Claim (1) it holds that \( b' \in K \). Moreover, \( \theta \in \Theta^C_b \) implies that \( \theta \) prefers school \( b \) to all other schools in \( K \), so \( b = b' \), contradiction. \( \square \)

Proof of Claim (5). Suppose for the sake of contradiction that \( K_\to \) is nonempty. Since some students in \( \sigma \) are being cleared in \( TTC (\gamma') \) at time \( t'_\sigma \), by Claim (3) there exists \( c \in K = K_\leftarrow \cup K_\to \) and \( b \in K \) such that \( \tilde{H}^C (\gamma' (t'_\sigma))_{cb} > 0 \). If \( c \in K_\to \) this contradicts Claim (6). If \( c \in K_\leftarrow \), then \( \tilde{H}^C (\gamma (t_\sigma))_{cb} > 0 \) and so by Claim (1) \( \tilde{H}^C (\gamma (t_\sigma))_{cb} > 0 \). Moreover, \( K = K_\leftarrow \cup K_\to \) is a recurrent communication class of \( \tilde{H}^C (\gamma (t_\sigma)) \), so there exists a chain \( c = c_0 - c_1 - c_2 - \cdots - c_n \) such that \( \tilde{H}^C (\gamma (t_\sigma))_{ci+1, ci} > 0 \) for all \( i < n \), \( c_i \in K_\leftarrow \) for all \( i < n - 1 \), and \( c_{n-1} \in K_\to \). By Claim (7) \( \tilde{H}^C (\gamma' (t'_\sigma))_{ci+1, ci} > 0 \) for all \( i < n \). But since \( c_{n-1} \in K_\to \), by Claim (6) \( \tilde{H}^C (\gamma' (t'_\sigma))_{cn-1, cn} = 0 \), which gives the required contradiction. \( \square \)

Proof that \( \Sigma = \Sigma' \). We have shown in Claims (4) and (5) that for our chosen \( \sigma = (K, \underline{x}, \overline{x}) \), it holds that \( \gamma (t_\sigma)_{K} = \gamma' (t'_\sigma)_{K} = \overline{x}_K \). Invoking Claims (2) and (3) and Lemma 9 shows that \( \sigma \) is cleared under both \( TTC (\gamma) \) and \( TTC (\gamma') \). Hence \( \Sigma = \Sigma' \), as required. \( \square \)

D.5 Proof of Proposition 2

Throughout the proof, we omit the dependence on \( E \) and let \( B^* (s) \) denote \( B^* (s \mid E) \). For brevity, we also let \( B (s) = \bigcap_{p \in \mathcal{P} (E)} B (s, p) \) denote the intersection of all possible
budget sets of $s$ in the continuum embedding with some path $\gamma$ and resulting cutoffs $p$. We construct TTC cutoffs $\{(p^s)_b^* = \gamma^s_\tau (t^{(c)})\}$ given by a TTC path $\gamma^*$ and stopping times $\{t^{(c)}\}_{c \in C}$ that satisfy trade balance and capacity for $\Phi(E)$ such that $B^*(s) \subseteq B(s) \subseteq B(s; p^*) \subseteq B^*(s)$.

We first show that $B^*(s) \subseteq B(s)$. Suppose $c \not\in B(s)$. Then there exists a TTC path $\gamma$ for $E$ such that $r^s + \frac{1}{|S|} 1 \leq \gamma(t^{(c)})$. Hence for all $\tilde{c}$ there exists a TTC path $\tilde{\gamma} \in \mathcal{P}([E_{-s}; \tilde{c}])$ such that $r^s + \frac{1}{|S|} 1 \leq \tilde{\gamma}(t^{(c)})$, e.g. the TTC path that follows the same valid directions as $\gamma$ until it assigns student $s$. By Proposition 9 and Theorem 2 for all $\tilde{c}$ it holds that $\mu_{\text{TTC}}(s | [E_{-s}; \tilde{c}]) = \max_{\tilde{c}} \{c : r^s_b \geq \tilde{\gamma}(t^{(c)})_b \text{ for some } b\}$. Hence for all $\tilde{c}$ it holds that $\mu_{\text{TTC}}(s | [E_{-s}; \tilde{c}]) \neq c$ and so $c \not\in B^*(s)$.

We next show that $B(s) \subseteq B(s; p^*) \subseteq B^*(s)$. Intuitively, we construct the special TTC path $\gamma^*$ for $E$ by clearing as many cycles as possible that do not involve student $s$. Formally, let $\triangleright$ be an ordering over subsets of $C$ where: (1) all subsets containing student $s$’s top choice available school $b$ (under the preferences $\succ^s$ in $E$) come after all subsets not containing $b$; and (2) subject to this, subsets are ordered via the shortlex order. Let $\gamma^*$ be the TTC path for $E$ obtained by selecting valid directions with minimal support under the order $\triangleright$. (Such a path exists since the resulting valid directions $d$ are piecewise Lipschitz continuous.)

It follows trivially from the definition of $B(s)$ that $B(s) \subseteq B(s; p^*)$. We now show that $B(s; p^*) \subseteq B^*(s)$. For suppose $c \in B(s; p^*)$. Consider the preferences $\succ'$ that put school $c$ first, and then all other schools in the order given by $\succ^s$. Let $E'$ denote the economy $[E_{-s}; \succ']$. It remains to show that $\mu_{\text{TTC}}(s | E') = c$.

Since $c \in B(s; p^*)$, it holds that $r^s \not\preceq \gamma^*(t^{(c)})$. In other words, if we let $\tau^* = \inf \{\tau : \gamma^*(\tau) \not\preceq r^s\}$ be the time that the cube $I^s$ corresponding to student $s$ starts clearing, then school $c$ is available at time $\tau^*$. Let $\gamma'$ be the TTC path for $E'$ obtained by selecting valid directions with minimal support under the order $\triangleright$, and let $\tau' \inf \{\tau : \gamma'(\tau) \not\preceq r^s\}$. We show that $\tau \leq \tau^*$ and school $c$ is available to student $s$ at time $\tau'$.

Consider the time interval $[0, \min \{\tau^*, \tau'\}]$. During this time the set of valid directions along the TTC path remain the same (i.e. $\frac{d\gamma'}{dt} = \frac{d\gamma^*}{dt}$), as the set of valid directions not involving student $s$ has not been assigned under either $\text{TTC}(\gamma^* | E)$ or $\text{TTC}(\gamma' | E')$ so we do not need to consider

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50 We say that a valid direction ‘involves’ a student $s$ if it starts at a point $x$ on the boundary of their cube $I^s$ and points into the interior of the cube.

51 More formally, no points in the cube corresponding to student $s$ are assigned.
the set of valid directions involving student $s$. Now at worst in going from $\gamma, E$ to $\gamma', [E_s; \succ']$ we have replaced a valid direction involving $s$ and $b$ with a different valid direction involving $s$ and not involving $b$, so student $s$ is assigned sooner in $\text{TTC}(\gamma'|E')$ than in $\text{TTC}(\gamma^*|E)$, giving $\tau' \leq \tau^*$. Hence $\gamma'(\tau') = \gamma^*(\tau')$ where $\tau' \leq \tau^* \leq t(c)$ and so school $c$ is available to student $s$ when she is assigned. Hence by Proposition 9 and Theorem 2 it holds that $\mu_{\text{TTC}}(s | E') = c$ and so $c \in B^*(s)$.

**E  Proofs for Section 4**

Throughout this section, we will say that a vector $d$ is a *valid direction at point* $x$ if $d$ satisfies the marginal trade balance equations at $x$, and $d \cdot 1 = -1$. We will also augment the notation from Section 3 to specify the economy. Specifically, for an economy $E = (\mathcal{C}, \Theta, \eta, q)$ let

$$D^c(x|E) = \eta \left( \{ \theta \mid r^\theta \neq x, Ch^\theta(C) = c \} \right)$$

denote the mass of students whose rank at some school $b$ is better than $x_b$ and their first choice is school $c$.

**E.1 Calculations for Section 4.1**

We calculate the TTC assignment for proximity-based priorities (the calculation for uncorrelated priority is identical to that of Example 2). Since the TTC assignment depends only on ordinal preferences, it can be calculated from the capacities $q_1, q_2$ and the function

$$Pr_1(x_1, x_2) = \text{Prob}(1 \succ 2 \mid r_1^s = x_1, r_2^s = x_2) = \frac{1}{3} \left( 1 + x_2 - x_1 \right)$$

where $Pr_1(x_1, x_2) : [0,1]^2 \rightarrow [0,1]$ fully specifies the joint distribution of ordinal preferences and priorities.

To calculate $H(\cdot, \cdot)$ we integrate $Pr_1$ over the marginal students, for example

$$\text{Prob}(1 \succ 2 \mid r_1^s = x_1, r_2^s \leq x_2) = \int_0^{x_2} Pr_1(x_1, r_2) dr_2 = \frac{1}{6} \left( 2 - 2x_1 + x_2 \right),$$
yields
\[ H(x_1, x_2) = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{1}{6} x_2 (4 + 2x_1 - x_2) \\ \frac{1}{6} x_1 (4 + x_1 - 2x_2) \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \frac{1}{6} x_2 (2 - 2x_1 + x_2) \\ \frac{1}{6} x_1 (2 - x_1 + 2x_2) \end{pmatrix} . \]

The trade balance equations are a set of linear equations that have a unique solution (up to normalization)
\[ d(x_1, x_2) = \frac{1}{x_1 + x_2(1 + x_2) + x_2(2 + x_2)} \begin{pmatrix} x_1(4 + x_1 - 2x_2) \\ x_2(2 - 2x_1 + x_2) \end{pmatrix}, \]
where we normalize so \( d_1(x_1, x_2) + d_2(x_1, x_2) = 1. \)

We solve for the TTC path numerically using the Mathematica function NDSolve:

\[ \text{solveTTCPath} = \text{NDSolve}\left[\begin{align*} 
&d_1(x_1, x_2) + d_2(x_1, x_2) = 1, \\
&\text{(other equations)} \right] \]

The numerical solution gives us the TTC path, which allows us to numerically solve for \( t(1) \) (the following correctly assumes that \( t(1) < t(2) \)):

Plugging the value of \( t(1) \) into the TTC path gives the cutoffs \( p_1 \approx 0.554, p_2 \approx 0.762 \), which give the set \( A_{1,2} \).
To solve for \( p_2^2 \) we first find that a mass of .178 of students in \( A_{\{1,2\}} \) prefer school 2. Therefore, the residual capacity of school 2 is \( q_2 - .178 = .222 \). The remaining TTC path is trivial, and we can calculate the cutoff \( p_2^2 \) by solving

\[
p_1^1 \left( p_1^1 - p_2^2 \right) = .222,
\]

yielding that \( p_2^2 = .361 \). This completes the calculation of the TTC assignment and fully specifies the sets \( A_{\{1,2\}}, A_{\{2\}} \) and \( A_\phi \).

To calculate welfare, we first calculate the expected utility of a student conditional on her priority and budget set. With slight abuse of notation, we write \( U^C(x_1, x_2) = \mathbb{E} \left[ \max_{c \in C} \left\{ u^\theta(c) \mid r^\theta_1 = x_1, r^\theta_2 = x_2 \right\} \right] \) and we have that

\[
U^{(1,2)}(x_1, x_2) = \frac{1}{6} \left( x_1^2 - 2x_1(x_2 - 2) + x_2(x_2 + 2) + 10 \right)
\]

\[
U^{(2)}(x_1, x_2) = 3/2 + x_1,
\]

\[
U^{(1)}(x_1, x_2) = 1 + x_2,
\]

and the welfare of TTC is given by

\[
W_{TTC,corr} = \sum_{C \subset C} \int_{s \in A_C} u^s(C) \, d\tilde{\eta}.
\]

To summarize, solving the trade balance and capacity equations yields the TTC cutoffs \( p_1^1 = p_1^2 \approx .554, p_2^2 \approx .762, p_2^2 \approx .361 \). Students in \( A_{\{1,2\}} = \left\{ \tilde{\theta} \mid r^\theta_1 \geq p_1^1 \text{ or } r^\theta_2 \geq p_2^1 \right\} \) have the budget set \( \{1, 2\} \), students in \( A_{\{2\}} = \left\{ \tilde{\theta} \mid r^\theta_1 < p_1^1 \text{ and } p_2^2 \leq r^\theta_2 < p_2^1 \right\} \) have the budget set \( \{2\} \), and remaining students are unassigned. Welfare under TTC is

\[
W_{TTC,corr} = \sum_{C \subset C} \int_{s \in A_C} u^s(C) \, d\tilde{\eta}
\]

\[
= N^{(1,2)} \cdot \mathbb{E} \left[ u^s(\{1, 2\}) \mid s \in A_{\{1,2\}} \right] + N^{(2)} \cdot \mathbb{E} \left[ u^s(\{2\}) \mid s \in A_{\{2\}} \right] = 1.7
\]

and distance traveled is

\[
Dist_{TTC,corr} = \int_{s \in A_{\{1,2\}}} 1 \{1 \succ s \, 2 \} \, d_1^s \tilde{\eta} + 1 \{2 \succ s \, 1 \} \, d_2^s \tilde{\eta} + \int_{s \in A_{\{2\}}} d_2^s \, d\tilde{\eta} = 0.26,
\]

where \( 1 \{ \cdot \} \) is the indicator function. Note that because preferences and priorities are correlated it is necessary to identify which students receive which budget set. The following Mathematica code calculates the integrals above:
E.2 Calculations for Proposition 4

In this section, we derive the expressions for the TTC and DA cutoffs under neighborhood priority. We use the methodologies developed in Section 3.2 and in Azevedo & Leshno (2016) to find the TTC and DA allocations respectively. For each school, students with priority are given a lottery number uniformly at random in \([\frac{n-1}{n}, 1]\), and students without priority are given a lottery number uniformly at random in \([0, \frac{n-1}{n}]\), where lottery numbers at different schools are independent.

Consider the TTC cutoffs for the neighborhood priority setting. We prove by induction on \(\ell\) that \(p_\ell^j = 1 - \frac{\alpha q}{nq}\) for all \(\ell, j\) such that \(j \geq \ell\).

**Base case:** \(\ell = 1\).

For each school \(i\), there are measure \(q\) of students whose first choice school is \(i\), \(\alpha q\) of whom have priority at \(i\) and \(\frac{(1-\alpha)q}{n-1}\) of whom have priority at school \(j\), for all \(j \neq i\).

The TTC path is given by the diagonal, \(\gamma(t) = \left(1 - \frac{t}{\sqrt{n}}, 1 - \frac{t}{\sqrt{n}}, \ldots, 1 - \frac{t}{\sqrt{n}}\right)\). At the point \(\gamma(t) = (x, x, \ldots, x)\) (where \(x \geq \frac{n-1}{n}\) a fraction \(n(1-x)\) of students from each neighborhood have been assigned. Since the same proportion of students have each school as their top choice, this means that the quantity of students assigned to each school \(i\) is \(n(1-x)q\). Hence the cutoffs are given by considering school 1, which
has the smallest capacity, and setting the quantity assigned to school 1 equal to its capacity $q_1$. It follows that $p^1_j = x^*$ for all $j$, where $n (1 - x^*) q = q_1$, which yields
\[ p^1_j = 1 - \frac{q_1}{nq} \text{ for all } j. \]

**Inductive step.**

Suppose we know that the cutoffs $\{p^i_j\}_{i,j:i \leq \ell}$ satisfy $p^i_j = 1 - \frac{q_i}{nq}$. We show by induction that the ($\ell + 1$)th set of cutoffs $\{p^\ell+1_j\}_{j > \ell}$ are given by $p^\ell+1_j = 1 - \frac{q_{\ell+1}}{nq}$.

The TTC path is given by the diagonal when restricted to the last $n - \ell$ coordinates, $\gamma(t^{(\ell)} + t) = \left(p^1_1, p^2_2, \ldots, p^\ell_\ell, \frac{t}{\sqrt{n-\ell}}, p^\ell_{\ell+1}, \ldots, p^n_{n-1}, \frac{t}{\sqrt{n-\ell}}\right)$.

Consider a neighborhood $i$. If $i > \ell$, at the point $\gamma(t) = (p^1_1, p^2_2, \ldots, p^\ell_\ell, x, x, \ldots, x)$ (where $x \geq \frac{n-1}{n}$) a fraction $n (p^\ell_\ell - x)$ of (all previously assigned and unassigned) students from neighborhood $i$ have been assigned in round $\ell + 1$. If $i \leq \ell$, no students from neighborhood $i$ have been assigned in round $\ell + 1$.

Consider the set of students $S$ who live in one of the neighborhoods $\ell + 1, \ell + 2, \ldots, n$. These are the only students who have priority at one of the remaining schools. Moreover, the same proportion of these students have each remaining school as their top choice out of the remaining schools. This means that for any $i > \ell$, the quantity of students assigned to school $i$ in round $\ell + 1$ by time $t$ is a $\frac{1}{n-\ell}$ fraction of the total number of students assigned in round $\ell + 1$ by time $t$, and is given by $\frac{1}{n-\ell} (n - \ell) (p^\ell_\ell - x) q = n (p^\ell_\ell - x) q$. Hence the cutoffs are given by considering school $\ell + 1$, which has the smallest residual, and setting the quantity assigned to school $\ell + 1$ equal to its residual capacity $q_{\ell+1} - q_\ell$. It follows that $p^{\ell+1}_j = x^*$ for all $j > \ell$ where $n (p^\ell_\ell - x^*) q = q_{\ell+1} - q_\ell$, which yields
\[ p^{\ell+1}_j = p^\ell_\ell - \frac{q_{\ell+1} - q_\ell}{nq} = 1 - \frac{q_\ell}{nq} - \frac{q_{\ell+1} - q_\ell}{nq} = 1 - \frac{q_{\ell+1}}{nq} \text{ for all } j > \ell. \]

This shows that the TTC cutoffs are given by $p^i_j = p^i_j = 1 - \frac{q_i}{nq}$ for all $i \leq j$.

Now consider the DA cutoffs. We show that the cutoffs $p_i = 1 - \frac{q_i}{nq}$ satisfy the supply-demand equations. We first remark that the cutoff at school $i$ is higher than all the ranks of students without priority at school $i$, $p_i \geq \frac{n-1}{n}$. Since every student has priority at exactly one school, this means that every student is either above the cutoff for exactly one school and is assigned to that school, or is below all the cutoffs and remains unassigned. Hence there are $nq (1 - p_i) = q_i$ students assigned to school $i$ for all $i$, and the supply-demand equations are satisfied.
Thus, for all values of \( \alpha \), the TTC cutoffs are given by \( p_{ij}^t = p_i^t = 1 - \frac{q_i}{nq} \) for all \( i \leq j \), and the DA cutoffs are given by \( p_i = 1 - \frac{q_i}{nq} \). The students who have the same assignments under TTC and DA are precisely the students at neighborhood \( i \) whose ranks at school \( i \) are above \( 1 - \frac{q_i}{nq} \), and whose first choice school is their neighborhood school. This set of students comprises an \( \alpha \sum \frac{q_i}{nq} \) fraction of the entire student population, which scales proportionally with the correlation between student preferences and school priorities.

### E.3 Proofs for Section 5.1

In this section, we assume that the total measure of students is 1, and speak of student measures and student proportions interchangeably.

#### Proof of Proposition 5

Given quality \( \delta \), let \( \eta \) be the measure over \( \Theta \) and \( \gamma, p, \{ t^{(1)}, t^{(2)} \} \) be the TTC path, cutoffs and stopping times. Given quality \( \hat{\delta} \), let \( \hat{\eta} \) be the measure over \( \Theta \) and \( \hat{\gamma}, \hat{p}, \{ \hat{t}^{(1)}, \hat{t}^{(2)} \} \) be the TTC path, cutoffs and stopping times.

For each \( x \in [0,1]^2 \) let \( d(x) \) (resp. \( \hat{d}(x) \)) denote the valid direction at \( x \) under \( E_\delta \) (resp. \( E_{\hat{\delta}} \)) with support that is minimal under the order \( \{ 1 \} < \{ 1, 2 \} < \{ 2 \} \).

As there are only two schools, \( |d_1(x)| \geq |d_1(x)| \) and \( |d_2(x)| \leq |\hat{d}_2(x)| \) for all \( x \).

It follows that \( \hat{\gamma} \) moves faster in the 2 direction than \( \gamma \) does, i.e. if \( \gamma_1(t) = \hat{\gamma}_1(\hat{t}) \) then \( \gamma_2(t) \geq \hat{\gamma}_2(\hat{t}) \), and if \( \gamma_2(t) = \hat{\gamma}_2(\hat{t}) \) then \( \gamma_1(t) \leq \hat{\gamma}_1(\hat{t}) \). Hence without loss of generality we may assume that the time parameters in the TTC paths are scaled so that at all times \( t \) the path \( \hat{\gamma} \) is dominated by \( \gamma \) via school 1, i.e. \( \gamma_1(t) = \hat{\gamma}_1(t) \) and \( \gamma_2(t) \geq \hat{\gamma}_2(t) \) for all \( t \) (see Appendix (D.2)).

Suppose for the sake of contradiction that \( p_1^t < \hat{p}_2^t \), i.e. \( \gamma_2(t^{(1)}) < \hat{\gamma}_2(\hat{t}^{(1)}) \). We may interpret this as it becoming more difficult to use priority at school 2 to trade into 1 after 2 gets more popular. We will show that this will also result in more students being assigned under \( \gamma \) by time \( t^{(1)} \) than under \( \hat{\gamma} \) by time \( \hat{t}^{(1)} \). But since school 1 is also more popular under \( E \) this means that more students are assigned to school 1 under TTC (\( \gamma | E \)) than TTC (\( \hat{\gamma} | \hat{E} \)), which gives the required contradiction.

More formally, since \( \hat{\gamma} \) is dominated by \( \gamma \) via school 1 at time \( t^{(1)} \) it follows that \( \hat{\gamma}_2(t^{(1)}) \leq \gamma_2(t^{(1)}) < \hat{\gamma}_2(\hat{t}^{(1)}) \) and so \( t^{(1)} < t^{(1)} \), i.e. school 1 now fills earlier. Hence \( \hat{\gamma}_1(\hat{t}^{(1)}) \geq \hat{\gamma}_1(t^{(1)}) = \gamma_1(t^{(1)}) \), where the equality comes from the assumption that \( \hat{\gamma} \) is dominated by \( \gamma \) via school 1 at time \( t^{(1)} \). But this gives the necessary contradiction,

52Note that by definition valid directions have norm 1.
as \( \hat{\gamma}(\hat{t}^{(1)}) \geq \gamma(t^{(1)}) \) implies that

\[
q_1 = D^1(\hat{\gamma}(\hat{t}^{(1)} | \mathcal{E}_\delta)) < D^1(\gamma(t^{(1)} | \mathcal{E}_\delta)) \leq D^1(\gamma(t^{(1)} | \mathcal{E}_\delta)) = q_1,
\]

where the first inequality follows from \( \hat{\gamma}(\hat{t}^{(1)}) \geq \gamma(t^{(1)}) \) and the second inequality holds since \( \hat{\delta}_2 \geq \delta_2 \) and \( \hat{\delta}_1 = \delta_1 \).

We now show that \( p_1^1 \geq \hat{p}_1^1 \), i.e. it becomes easier to use priority at school 1 to be assigned to school 1. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that \( p_1^1 < \hat{p}_1^1 \), i.e. \( \gamma(t^{(1)}) < \hat{\gamma}(\hat{t}^{(1)}) \). We will use the marginal trade balance equations to show that this means more students traded into school 1 under \( \gamma \) by time \( t^{(1)} \) than under \( \hat{\gamma} \) by time \( \hat{t}^{(1)} \), which gives the required contradiction.

Since \( \hat{\gamma} \) is dominated by \( \gamma \) via school 1 it holds that \( \hat{\gamma}(\hat{t}^{(1)}) = \gamma(t^{(1)}) < \hat{\gamma}(\hat{t}^{(1)}) \) and so \( t^{(1)} > \hat{t}^{(1)} \), i.e. school 1 fills earlier under \( TTC(\hat{\gamma} | \hat{\mathcal{E}}) \). Hence the sets of students offered seats by school 1 satisfy

\[
\mathcal{T}_1(\gamma; t^{(1)}) \supseteq \mathcal{T}_1(\gamma; \hat{t}^{(1)}) \supseteq \mathcal{T}_1(\hat{\gamma}; \hat{t}^{(1)}),
\]

where the first containment follows from the fact that \( t^{(1)} > \hat{t}^{(1)} \) and the second containment follows from the fact that \( \hat{\gamma} \) is dominated by \( \gamma \) via school 1, and so fewer students are offered/trade away seats at school 1 by time \( \hat{t}^{(1)} \) under \( \hat{\gamma} \) than under \( \gamma \).

Moreover, integrating over the marginal trade balance equations gives that under both paths, the set of students who traded a seat at 2 for a seat at 1 has the same measure as the set of students who traded a seat at 1 for a seat at 2,

\[
\eta\left(\left\{ \theta \in \mathcal{T}_2(\gamma; t^{(1)}) \mid Ch^\theta\{1,2\} = 1 \right\}\right) = \eta\left(\left\{ \theta \in \mathcal{T}_1(\gamma; t^{(1)}) \mid Ch^\theta\{1,2\} = 2 \right\}\right) \quad \text{and} \quad (5)
\]

\[
\hat{\eta}\left(\left\{ \theta \in \mathcal{T}_2(\hat{\gamma}; \hat{t}^{(1)}) \mid Ch^\theta\{1,2\} = 1 \right\}\right) = \hat{\eta}\left(\left\{ \theta \in \mathcal{T}_1(\hat{\gamma}; \hat{t}^{(1)}) \mid Ch^\theta\{1,2\} = 2 \right\}\right). \quad (6)
\]

Hence we can compare the number of students assigned to school 1 using these sets,
and find that
\begin{align*}
q_1 &= \eta \left( \{ \theta \in T_1 (\gamma; t(1)) \mid Ch\{1, 2\} = 1 \} \right) + \eta \left( \{ \theta \in T_2 (\gamma; t(1)) \mid Ch\{1, 2\} = 1 \} \right) \\
&= \eta \left( \{ \theta \in T_1 (\gamma; t(1)) \} \right) \quad \text{(by (5))} \\
&> \eta \left( \{ \theta \in T_1 (\hat{\gamma}; \hat{t}(1)) \} \right) \quad \text{(since the sets are strictly contained)} \\
&= \hat{\eta} \left( \{ \theta \in T_1 (\hat{\gamma}; \hat{t}(1)) \} \right) \\
&= \eta \left( \{ \theta \in T_1 (\gamma; t(1)) \mid Ch\{1, 2\} = 1 \} \right) + \hat{\eta} \left( \{ \theta \in T_2 (\gamma; t(1)) \mid Ch\{1, 2\} = 1 \} \right) \\
&\quad \text{(by (5))} \\
&= q_1
\end{align*}

which gives the required contradiction.

The fact that \( \hat{p}_2^2 \geq p_2^2 \) follows from the fact that \( \hat{p}_1^1 \leq p_1^1 \) decreases, since the total number of assigned students is the same. \( \Box \)

**Proof of Proposition 6.**

In the logit economy we assume that the total measure of students is normalized to 1, and that \( \sum_c q_c < 1 \). Recall that we also assume that all students prefer all schools to being unassigned. Note that the logit economy yields that \( P(Ch^\theta (C) = c) = \frac{e^{\delta c}}{\sum_{a \in C} e^{\delta a}} \).

We first show that schools are labeled in order if \( q_1 e^{\delta_1} \leq q_2 e^{\delta_2} \leq \cdots \leq q_n e^{\delta_n} \). This holds since at any point \( \gamma (t) = x \) in the first round the choice probabilities yield that \( \frac{e^{\delta_c}}{\sum_{a \in C} e^{\delta_a}} (1 - \prod_b x_b) \) students are assigned to school \( c \), and so for all \( b, c \) the ratio of students assigned to schools \( b \) and \( c \) respectively is \( \frac{e^{\delta_b}}{e^{\delta_c}} \) and if the schools are labeled in order then \( \frac{q_1}{e^{\delta_1}} = \min_c \frac{q_c}{e^{\delta_c}} \). The other inequalities hold by induction, since in any round with remaining schools \( C \) and \( c \in C \) the choice probabilities yield that a fraction \( \frac{e^{\delta_c}}{\sum_{a \in C} e^{\delta_a}} \) of the students assigned to schools in \( C \) are assigned to school \( c \) so again for all \( b, c \in C \) the ratio of students assigned to schools \( b \) and \( c \) respectively in that round (or any preceding round) is \( \frac{e^{\delta_b}}{e^{\delta_c}} \).

This also shows that \( R^c = 1 - \sum_{c' < c} q_{c'} - \frac{p_c}{e^{\delta_c}} q_c \) is the measure of unassigned, or remaining, students after the \( c \)th round, since if \( c' < c \) then \( q_{c'} \) students are assigned to school \( c' \), and if \( c' \geq c \) then \( \frac{e^{\delta_{c'}}}{e^{\delta_c}} q_c \) students are assigned to school \( c' \).

**TTC Cutoffs** We calculate the TTC cutoffs under the logit economy for different student choice probabilities by using the TTC paths and trade balance equations.
We show by induction on $c$ that for all $c$

$$p_b^c = \begin{cases} \left( \prod_{a \leq c} \left( \frac{R^a}{R^{a-1}} \right)^{1/\eta_a} \right)^{e^\delta_b} & \text{if } b \geq c, \\ p_b^b & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases} \quad (7)$$

where $\pi_c = \sum_{c' \geq c} e^{\delta_{c'}}$, $R^0 = 1$ and for all $c \geq 1$ the quantity $R^c = 1 - \sum_{c' < c} q_{c'} - \frac{\pi_c}{e^{\delta_{c}}} q_c$ is the measure of unassigned, or remaining, students after the $c$th round. We note that if we let $\rho_c = \frac{q_c}{e^{\delta_{c}}} - \frac{q_{c-1}}{e^{\delta_{c-1}}}$, where $q_{c-1} = \delta_{c-1} = 0$, then

$$R^{c-1} - R^c = -\frac{\pi_{c-1}}{e^{\delta_{c-1}}} q_{c-1} + \frac{\pi_c}{e^{\delta_{c}}} q_c = \rho_c \pi_c,$$

and so

$$\sum_{c' \leq c} \rho_{c'} \pi_{c'} = \sum_{c' \leq c} R^{c'-1} - R^{c'} = 1 - R^c.$$

Consider the base case $c = 1$. In round 1, the marginals $H_b^c (x)$ for $b, c \in C$ at each point $x \in [0, 1]$ are given by $H_b^c (x) = \frac{e^{\delta_c}}{\sum_{a \in C} e^{\delta_a}} \prod_{c' \neq b} x_{c'}$. As the valid directions $d = d(x)$ solve the marginal trade balance equations, they must satisfy $\sum_{a \in C} d_a H_a^c (x) = \sum_{a \in C} d_c H_c^a (x)$, or equivalently

$$e^{\delta_c} \sum_{a \in C} \frac{d_a}{x_a} = \frac{d_c}{x_c} \sum_{a \in C} e^{\delta_a}.$$

Now the vector $d(x)$ defined by

$$d_c (x) = -\frac{e^{\delta_c} x_c}{\sum_{b \in C} e^{\delta_b} x_b}$$

clearly satisfies both the marginal trade balance equations and the normalization $d(x) \cdot 1 = -1$. Moreover since $H(x)$ is irreducible this is the unique valid direction $d$.

We now find a valid TTC path $\gamma$ using the trade balance equations (2). Since the ratios of the components of the gradient $\frac{d_b(x)}{d_c(x)}$ only depend on $x_b, x_c$ and the $\delta_{c'}$, for all $c$ we solve for $x_c$ in terms of $x_1$, using the marginal trade balance equations and the fact that the path starts at $1$. This gives the path $\gamma$ defined by $\gamma_c \left( \gamma_1^{-1} (x_1) \right) = x_1 e^{\delta_{c} - \delta_1}$ for all $c$.

Recall that the schools are indexed so that school $c_1$ is the most demanded school,
that is, \( \phi_{q_1}^c = \max_c \phi_{q_c}^c \). Now school \( c_1 \) fills at a time \( t^{(1)} \) where the TTC path is given by \( \gamma_c \left( t^{(1)} \right) = x_1 e^{\delta_{c-1}} \) and the number of assigned students is given by

\[
1 - \prod_{c} \gamma_c \left( t^{(1)} \right) = 1 - R^1
\]

where the left hand side is the measure of students with rank at least \( \gamma_c \left( t^{(1)} \right) \) for at least one school \( c \), and the right hand side is the number of assigned students.

This yields that

\[
p_b^1 = \gamma_c \left( t^{(1)} \right) = \left( \prod_{c} \gamma_c \left( t^{(1)} \right) \right) \frac{e^{\delta_b}}{\pi_1} = \left( R^1 \right) \frac{e^{\delta_b}}{\pi_1}.
\]

where \( \pi_1 = \sum_{c \geq 1} e^{\delta_c} \). This completes the base case.

For the inductive step, suppose that Equation (7) holds for the cutoffs in rounds 1, 2, \ldots, \( c - 1 \). Consider the residual TTC path during the \( c \)th round and let it be denoted by \( \tilde{\gamma} \). For all \( b \geq c \) let \( x_b = \tilde{\gamma}_b \left( t \right) \). Recall that by definition \( \tilde{\gamma}_b \left( t \right) = p_b^{c-1} = p_b^b \) for all \( b < c \) and \( t \geq t^{(c-1)} \). The residual TTC path is non-constant only for schools \( b \) in the set \( C^{(c)} = \{c, c+1, \ldots, n\} \), and the marginal trade balance conditions specify that for these schools \( b \) and for all \( x \leq p_b^{-1} \) it holds that \( \frac{d_b(x)}{d_c(x)} = \frac{e^{\delta_b} x_b}{e^{\delta_c} x_c} \). Therefore we can solve for \( x_b \) in terms of \( x_c \), using the fact that the path starts at \( p_b^{c-1} \). The marginal trade balance conditions and initial conditions yield that for all \( b \geq c \)

\[
\frac{\tilde{\gamma}_b \left( t \right) - e^{\delta_b}}{\tilde{\gamma}_c \left( t \right) - e^{\delta_c}} = \frac{(p_b^{c-1})^{-e^{-\delta_b}}}{(p_c^{c-1})^{-e^{-\delta_c}}} = 1,
\]

where the first equality is obtained by integrating over the marginal trade balance equations and providing the initial conditions, and the second equality holds by substituting in the values of \( p_b^{c-1} \) in the inductive assumption. Hence the path \( \tilde{\gamma} \) is defined by \( \tilde{\gamma}_b \left( \tilde{\gamma}_c^{-1} \left( x_c \right) \right) = x_b e^{\delta_{c-b}} \) for all \( b \geq c \), and \( \tilde{\gamma}_b \left( t^{(c)} \right) = p_b^b \) for all \( b < c \).

Now school \( c_c \) fills at a time \( t^{(c)} \) where the TTC path is given by \( \tilde{\gamma}_b \left( t^{(c)} \right) = x_c e^{\delta_{c-b}} \) for all \( b \geq c \) and \( \tilde{\gamma}_b \left( t^{(c)} \right) = p_b^b \) for all \( b < c \), and the number of students assigned from time \( t^{(c-1)} \) to \( t^{(c)} \) is given by

\[
\prod_{c' \in C^c} p_{c'}^{c-1} - \prod_{c' < c} p_{c'}^{c-1} \prod_{b \geq c} \tilde{\gamma}_b \left( t^{(c)} \right) = R^{c-1} - R^c, \tag{8}
\]

where the left hand side is the measure of students with rank at least \( \tilde{\gamma}_b \left( t^{(c)} \right) \) for at
least one school \( b \) who is not assigned in one of the first \( c - 1 \) rounds. Noting that

\[
\prod_{b} p_{b}^{c-1} = \left( \prod_{b < c - 1} p_{b}^{b} \right) \left( \prod_{b \geq c - 1} p_{b}^{c-1} \right) = \left( \prod_{a < c - 1} \left( \frac{R^{a}}{R^{a-1}} \right)^{1 - \pi_{c-1}/\pi_{a}} \right) \left( \prod_{a \leq c - 1} \left( \frac{R^{a}}{R^{a-1}} \right)^{\pi_{c-1}/\pi_{a}} \right) = R^{c-1}
\]

allows us to simplify equation (8) to

\[
\prod_{b \geq c} x_{c}^{e_{b} - \delta_{c}} = \frac{R^{c}}{\prod_{c' < c} p_{c'}^{c-1}}.
\]

Substituting in \( p_{c'}^{c-1} = \left( \prod_{a \leq c'} \left( \frac{R^{a}}{R^{a-1}} \right)^{1/\pi_{a}} \right)^{e_{c'}} \) yields

\[
x_{b} = x_{c}^{e_{b} / e_{c}} = \left( R^{c} \prod_{a < c} \left( \frac{R^{a}}{R^{a-1}} \right)^{- (\pi_{a} - \pi_{c})/\pi_{a}} \right)^{e_{b} / \pi_{c}} = \left( \prod_{a \leq c} \left( \frac{R^{a}}{R^{a-1}} \right)^{1/\pi_{a}} \right)^{e_{b}}
\]

as required.

\[\square\]

**TTC Cutoffs - Comparative Statics** We perform some comparative statics calculations for the TTC cutoffs under the logit model. For \( b \neq \ell \) it holds that the TTC cutoff \( p_{b}^{1} \) for using priority at school \( b \) to receive a seat at school 1 is decreasing in \( \delta_{b} \). Formally,

\[
\frac{\partial p_{b}^{1}}{\partial \delta_{b}} = \frac{\partial}{\partial \delta_{b}} \left[ (1 - \rho_{1} \pi_{1}) \frac{e_{b}}{\tau_{1}} \right] = -p_{b}^{1} \left( \frac{e_{\delta_{b} + \delta_{b}}}{(\tau_{1})^{2}} \right) \left[ - \ln \left( \frac{1}{1 - \rho_{1} \pi_{1}} \right) + \frac{1}{(1 - \rho_{1} \pi_{1}) - 1} \right]
\]

is negative, since \( 0 < \frac{1}{(1 - \rho_{1} \pi_{1})} < 1 \) and \( f (x) = x - \ln (x) - 1 \) is positive for \( x \in [0, 1] \).

For \( b = \ell \) the TTC cutoff \( p_{\ell}^{1} \) is again decreasing in \( \delta_{\ell} \);

\[
\frac{\partial p_{\ell}^{1}}{\partial \delta_{\ell}} = \frac{\partial}{\partial \delta_{\ell}} \left[ (1 - \rho_{1} \pi_{1}) \frac{e_{\delta_{\ell}}}{\tau_{1}} \right] = -p_{\ell}^{1} \left( \frac{e_{\delta_{\ell}}}{(\pi_{1})^{2}} \right) \ln \left( \frac{1}{1 - \rho_{1} \pi_{1}} \right) - p_{\ell}^{1} \left( \frac{e^{2 \delta_{\ell}}}{(\pi_{1})^{2}} \right) \left[ - \frac{1}{(1 - \rho_{1} \pi_{1}) - 1} \right]
\]

\[34\]
is negative since both terms are negative.

Similarly, for \( c < \ell \) and \( b \geq c \) the TTC cutoff \( p^c_\ell \) is decreasing in \( \delta_\ell \). We first show that this holds for \( c < \ell \) and \( b \geq c, b \neq \ell \) by showing that \( \frac{1}{e^{\delta_\ell}} \ln p^c_\ell \) is decreasing in \( \delta_\ell \). Now

\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial \delta_\ell} \left[ \ln \left( \frac{R^a}{R^{a-1}} \right) \right] = \frac{\partial}{\partial \delta_\ell} \left[ \frac{1}{\pi_a} \ln \left( \frac{R^a}{R^{a-1}} \right) \right] = \sum_{a \leq c} \left( -\frac{e^{\delta_\ell}}{(\pi_a)^2} \right) \left[ \ln \left( \frac{R^a}{R^{a-1}} \right) - \frac{\pi_a}{e^{\delta_\ell}} \cdot \frac{\partial}{\partial \delta_\ell} \left[ \ln \left( \frac{R^a}{R^{a-1}} \right) \right] \right]
\]

where

\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial \delta_\ell} \left[ \ln \left( \frac{R^a}{R^{a-1}} \right) \right] = \frac{R^{a-1} \frac{\partial}{\partial \delta_\ell} R^a - R^a \frac{\partial}{\partial \delta_\ell} R^{a-1}}{R^{a-1} R^a} = -\frac{e^{\delta_\ell}}{R^{a-1} R^a} \left[ R^{a-1} \left( \frac{q_a}{e^{\delta_\ell}} - R^a \left( \frac{q_{a-1}}{e^{\delta_{a-1}}} \right) \right) \right] = -\frac{e^{\delta_\ell} \rho_a}{R^{a-1} R^a} \left[ R^{a-1} \rho_a + \pi_a \rho_a \left( \frac{q_{a-1}}{e^{\delta_{a-1}}} \right) \right] = -\frac{e^{\delta_\ell} \rho_a}{R^{a-1} R^a} \left( 1 - \sum_{c' < a} q_{c'} \right).
\]

Hence

\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial \delta_\ell} \left[ \frac{1}{e^{\delta_\ell}} \ln p^c_\ell \right] = \sum_{a \leq c} \left( -\frac{e^{\delta_\ell}}{(\pi_a)^2} \right) \left[ \ln \left( \frac{R^a}{R^{a-1}} \right) + \left( \frac{1}{R^a} - \frac{1}{R^{a-1}} \right) \left( 1 - \sum_{c' < a} q_{c'} \right) \right] \leq 0
\]

where the last inequality holds since for all \( a \) the first term is negative, and the second term is given by \( f_a \left( R^a \right) - f_a \left( R^{a-1} \right) \) where \( f_a \left( x \right) = \left( 1 - \sum_{c' < a} q_{c'} \right) \frac{1}{x} + \ln \left( x \right) \) has negative derivative \( f'_a \left( x \right) \leq 0 \) for all \( x \geq \left( 1 - \sum_{c' < a} q_{c'} \right) \), and \( R^a \leq R^{a-1} < \left( 1 - \sum_{c' < a} q_{c'} \right) \) so \( f_a \left( R^a \right) - f_a \left( R^{a-1} \right) \geq 0 \).

For \( c < \ell \) and \( b = \ell \) the TTC cutoff \( p^c_\ell \) is also decreasing in \( \delta_\ell \), since

\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial \delta_\ell} \left[ \ln p^c_\ell \right] = \frac{\partial}{\partial \delta_\ell} \left[ \frac{e^{\delta_\ell}}{e^{\delta_\ell}} \ln p^c_\ell \right] = \frac{e^{\delta_\ell}}{e^{\delta_\ell}} \left( \ln p^c_\ell + \frac{\partial}{\partial \delta_\ell} \left[ \ln p^c_\ell \right] \right) \leq 0
\]

where the last inequality holds since \( p^c_\ell < 1 \) and we have shown that \( \frac{\partial}{\partial \delta_\ell} \left[ \ln p^c_\ell \right] \leq 0 \).

When \( c = \ell \) and \( b > \ell \), we note that
$$\prod_{a \geq \ell} p_a^\ell \prod_{c < \ell} p_c^\ell = R^\ell, \text{ i.e.}$$

$$p_b^\ell = \left( \frac{R^\ell}{\prod_{c < \ell} P_c^\ell} \right)^{e_b^\ell / \pi_c^\ell}.$$

Hence

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \delta_b} \left[ \frac{1}{e_b^\ell} \ln p_b^\ell \right] = \frac{\partial}{\partial \delta_c} \left[ \frac{1}{\pi_c^\ell} \left( \ln R^\ell - \sum_{c' < \ell} \ln p_{c'}^\ell \right) \right]$$

$$= \left( - \frac{e_b^\ell}{\pi_c^\ell} \right)^2 \left( \ln R^\ell - \sum_{c' < \ell} \ln p_{c'}^\ell \right)$$

$$+ \frac{1}{\pi_c^\ell} \left( \frac{\partial}{\partial \delta_b} \left[ \ln R^\ell \right] - \sum_{c' < \ell} \frac{\partial}{\partial \delta_c} \left[ \ln p_{c'}^\ell \right] \right)$$

$$\geq 0.$$ 

where the first term is positive since $p_b^\ell < 1$ (from which it follows that $\ln R^\ell - \sum_{c' < \ell} \ln (p) < 0$), and the second term is positive since $\frac{\partial p_c^\ell}{\partial \delta_b} = \frac{\pi_{c+1}}{(e_b^\ell)} q_c^\ell > 0$ and we have shown that for all $c' < \ell$ it holds that $\frac{\partial}{\partial \delta_c} \ln p_{c'}^\ell \leq 0$.

Proof of Proposition 7.

**Welfare Expressions** We derive the welfare expressions corresponding to these cutoffs. Let $C^{(c)} = \{c, c + 1, \ldots, n\}$. Since the schools are ordered so that $\frac{q_{c+1}}{\ell_{c+1}} \leq \frac{q_{c+1}}{\ell_{c+1}} \leq \cdots \leq \frac{q_n}{\ell_n}$, it follows that the schools also fill in the order $1, 2, \ldots, n$.

Suppose that the total mass of students is 1. Then the mass of students with budget set $C^{(1)}$ is given by $N^1 = q_1 \left( \frac{\sum e_b^h}{\ell_{c+1}} \right) = \rho_1 \pi_1$, and the mass of students with budget set $C^{(2)}$ is given by $N^2 = \left( q_2 - \sum_{c = 1}^\infty e_b^h \right) \left( \frac{\sum b \geq 2 e_b^h}{\ell_{c+2}} \right) = \left( \frac{q_2}{\ell_{c+2}} - \frac{q_1}{\ell_{c+1}} \right) \left( \sum b \geq 2 e_b^h \right) = \rho_2 \pi_2$.

A straightforward inductive argument shows that the proportion of students with budget set $C^{(c)}$ is

$$N^c = \left( \frac{q_c}{\ell_{c+1}} - \frac{q_{c-1}}{\ell_{c+1}} \right) \left( \sum_{b \geq c} e_b^h \right) = \rho_c \pi_c.$$

which depends only on $\delta_b$ for $b \geq c - 1$.

Moreover, each such student with budget set $C^{(c)}$, conditional on their budget set,
Welfare - Comparative Statics Taking derivatives, we obtain that

\[
\frac{dU_{TTC}}{d\delta} = \sum_c \left( \frac{dN_c}{d\delta} \cdot U^c + N^c \cdot \frac{dU^c}{d\delta} \right) = \sum_{c \leq \ell + 1} \frac{dN_c}{d\delta} \cdot U^c + \sum_{c \leq \ell} N^c \cdot \frac{dU^c}{d\delta} ,
\]

where \(\sum_{c \leq \ell} N^c \cdot \frac{dU^c}{d\delta} = \sum_{c \leq \ell} \rho_c \pi_c \cdot e^{\delta_c} = e^{\delta_c} \sum_{c \leq \ell} \rho_c = q_{\ell} \). It follows that

\[
\frac{dU_{TTC}}{d\delta} = q_{\ell} + \sum_{c \leq \ell + 1} \frac{dN_c}{d\delta} \cdot U^c .
\]

Proof of Proposition 3. We solve for the social welfare maximizing budget allocation. For a fixed runout ordering (i.e. \(\frac{q_1}{e^{\delta_1}} \leq \frac{q_2}{e^{\delta_2}} \leq \cdots \leq \frac{q_n}{e^{\delta_n}}\)), the central school board’s investment problem is given by the program

\[
\max_{\kappa_1, \kappa_2, \ldots, \kappa_n} \sum_i \left( \frac{q_i}{\kappa_i} - \frac{q_{i-1}}{\kappa_{i-1}} \right) \left( \sum_{j \geq i} \kappa_j \right) \ln \left( \sum_{j \geq i} \kappa_j \right)
\]

subject to
\[
\frac{q_i}{\kappa_i - \sum_{i} \kappa_i} \leq \frac{q_i}{\kappa_i - \sum_{i} \kappa_i} \forall i ,
\]

\[
\sum_i \kappa_i = K ,
\]

\[
q_0 = 0 .
\]

We can reformulate this as the following program,

\[
\max_{\kappa_2, \ldots, \kappa_n} \left( \frac{q_1}{K - \sum_{i} \kappa_i} \right) K \ln K + \left( \frac{q_2}{K - \sum_{i} \kappa_i} - \frac{q_1}{K - \sum_{i} \kappa_i} \right) \pi_2 \ln \pi_2 + \sum_{i \geq 3} \left( \frac{q_i}{\kappa_i} - \frac{q_{i-1}}{\kappa_{i-1}} \right) \pi_i \ln \pi_i
\]
\[ s.t. \quad \frac{q_{i-1}}{\kappa_{i-1}} \leq \frac{q_i}{\kappa_i} \quad \forall i \geq 3 \]
\[ \frac{q_1}{K - \sum_i \kappa_i} \leq \frac{q_2}{\kappa_2}, \]
\[ \pi_i = \sum_{j \geq i} \kappa_j. \]

Taking the derivatives of the objective \( U \) with respect to the budget allocations \( \kappa_k \) gives
\[ \frac{\partial U}{\partial \kappa_k} = \left( \frac{q_1}{(K - \sum_i \kappa_i)^2} \right) \ln \left( \frac{K^K}{\pi_k^2} \right) + \sum_{2 \leq i < k} \frac{q_i}{\kappa_i} \ln \frac{\pi_i}{\pi_{i+1}} + \frac{q_k}{\kappa_k} \ln \left( \frac{\pi_k}{\pi_{k+1}} \right), \]
where \( \ln \left( \frac{K^K}{\pi_k^2} \right) \geq 0, \ln \frac{\pi_i}{\pi_{i+1}} \geq 0, \) and \( \ln \left( \frac{\pi_k}{\pi_{k+1}} \right) \) and so \( \frac{\partial U}{\partial \kappa_k} \geq 0 \forall k. \)

Moreover, if \( \frac{q_{i-1}}{\kappa_{i-1}} = \frac{q_i}{\kappa_i} \), then defining a new problem with \( n - 1 \) schools, and capacities \( \tilde{q} \) and budget \( \tilde{\kappa} \)
\[ \tilde{q}_j = \begin{cases} q_j & \text{if } j < i - 1 \\ q_{i-1} + q_i & \text{if } j = i - 1 \\ q_{j+1} & \text{if } j > i - 1 \end{cases}, \quad \tilde{\kappa}_j = \begin{cases} \kappa_j & \text{if } j < i - 1 \\ \kappa_{i-1} + \kappa_i & \text{if } j = i - 1 \\ \kappa_{j+1} & \text{if } j > i - 1 \end{cases} \]
leads to a problem with the same objective function, since
\[
\left( \frac{q_{i-1}}{\kappa_{i-1}} - \frac{q_i}{\kappa_i} \right) \ln \pi_{i-1} + \left( q_{i-1} - \frac{q_i}{\kappa_i} \right) \frac{\pi_i}{\pi_{i+1}} + \left( \frac{q_{i+1}}{\kappa_{i+1}} - q_i \right) \frac{\pi_i}{\pi_{i+1}} \ln \pi_{i+1} \\
= \left( \frac{q_{i-1} + q_{i-2}}{\kappa_{i-1} + \kappa_i} \right) \pi_{i-1} \ln \pi_{i-1} + \left( \frac{q_{i+1}}{\kappa_{i+1}} - q_i \right) \frac{\pi_i}{\pi_{i+1}} \ln \pi_{i+1}. \]

Hence if there exists \( i \) for which \( \frac{q_{i-1}}{\kappa_{i-1}} \neq \frac{q_i}{\kappa_i} \), we may take \( i \) to be minimal such that this occurs, decrease each of \( \kappa_1, \ldots, \kappa_{i-1} \) proportionally so that \( \kappa_1 + \cdots + \kappa_{i-1} \) decreases by \( \varepsilon \) and increase \( \kappa_i \) by \( \varepsilon \) and increase the resulting value of the objective. It follows that the objective is maximized when \( \frac{q_1}{\kappa_1} = \frac{q_2}{\kappa_2} = \cdots = \frac{q_n}{\kappa_n}, \) i.e. when the money assigned to each school is proportional to the number of seats at the school. \( \square \)

### E.4 Design of TTC Priorities

We demonstrate how to calculate the TTC cutoffs for the two economies in Figure 9 by using the TTC paths and trade balance equations.

Consider the economy \( \mathcal{E} \), where the top priority students have ranks uniformly
distributed in $[m, 1]^2$. If $x = (x_1, x_2)$ is on the diagonal, then $\tilde{H}_i^j (x) = x_i^2$ for all $i, j \in \{1, 2\}$, and so there is a unique valid direction $d (\tilde{x}) = \begin{bmatrix} -\frac{1}{2} \\ -\frac{1}{2} \end{bmatrix}$. Moreover, $\gamma (t) = \left( \frac{t}{2}, \frac{1}{2} \right)$ satisfies $\frac{d \gamma (t)}{dt} = d (\gamma (t))$ for all $t$ and hence Theorem 2 implies that $\gamma (t) = \left( \frac{t}{2}, \frac{1}{2} \right)$ is the unique TTC path. The cutoff points satisfy $p_1^1 = p_2^1 = p_1^2 = p_2^2 = p$ for some constant $p$, and (by symmetry) the capacity equations $D^1 (p) = D^2 (p) = q$.

Consider now the economy $\mathcal{E}$, where top priority students have ranks uniformly distributed in the $\tilde{r} \times \tilde{r}$ square $(1 - \tilde{r}, 1) \times (m, m + \tilde{r})$ for some small $\tilde{r}$, where $\tilde{r} \leq \frac{(2m - 1)(1 - m)}{2m}$.

If $x$ is in $(1 - \tilde{r}, 1] \times [m + \tilde{r}, 1]$ then $H_1^j (x) = \frac{1}{2} (m + (1 - m) \frac{1 - m}{\tilde{r}}) \forall j$ and $H_2^j (x) = \frac{m}{2} \forall j$, so there is a unique valid direction $d (x) = \frac{1}{2 + (1 - m)^2} \begin{bmatrix} -1 \\ -1 - \frac{(1 - m)^2}{\tilde{r}^m} \end{bmatrix}$. If $x$ is in $(m, 1 - \tilde{r}] \times (1, 1]$ then $H_1^j (x) = \frac{m}{2}$ for all $i, j$ and there is a unique valid direction $d (x) = \begin{bmatrix} -\frac{1}{2} \\ -\frac{1}{2} \end{bmatrix}$. Finally, if $x = (x_1, x_2)$ is in $[0, 1] \setminus [m, 1]^2$ then $H_1^j (x) = \frac{1}{2} x_2$ and $H_2^j = \frac{1}{2} x_1$ for all $j$ and there is a unique valid direction $d (x) = \frac{1}{x_1 + x_2} \begin{bmatrix} -x_1 \\ -x_2 \end{bmatrix}$.

Hence the TTC path $\gamma (t)$ has gradient proportional to $\begin{bmatrix} -\frac{1}{2} \\ -\frac{1}{2} \end{bmatrix}$ from the point $(1, 1)$ to the point $(1 - \tilde{r}, 1 - \tilde{r} - \frac{(1 - m)^2}{m})$, to $\begin{bmatrix} -\frac{1}{2} \\ -\frac{1}{2} \end{bmatrix}$ from the point $(1 - \tilde{r}, 1 - \tilde{r} - \frac{(1 - m)^2}{m})$ to the point $(m + (1 - m)^2, m)$ and to $\begin{bmatrix} -1 - \frac{(1 - m)^2}{m^2} \\ -1 \end{bmatrix}$ from the point $(m + (1 - m)^2, m)$ to the cutoff point $(\overline{p}, p)$.

We find that $(\overline{p}, p) = \left( \sqrt{(1 - 2q) \frac{(1 - 2m + 2m^2)}{m^2}}, \sqrt{(1 - 2q) \frac{m^2}{1 - 2m + 2m^2}} \right)$ by observing that $\frac{1}{2} (1 - \overline{p} \cdot p) = D^1 ((\overline{p}, p)) = q$ and that $(\overline{p}, p)$ lies on the line passing through $(m + (1 - m)^2, m)$ with gradient $\frac{1}{1 + \frac{(1 - m)^2}{m^2}}$.

We now show that the economy $\mathcal{E}$ is extremal, i.e. if economy $\mathcal{E}'$ is given by perturbing the relative ranks of students in $\{ \theta \mid r^c_\theta \geq m \ \forall c \}$, then the TTC cutoffs for $\mathcal{E}'$ are given by $p_1^1 = p_2^1 = x$, $p_1^2 = p_2^2 = y$ where $x \leq \overline{p} = \sqrt{\frac{1 - 2q}{1 - 2m + 2m^2}}$ and $y \geq \underline{p} = \sqrt{(1 - 2q) (1 - 2m + 2m^2)}$. (By symmetry, it follows that $\underline{p} \leq x, y \leq \overline{p}$.)
Let $\gamma$ and $\gamma'$ be the TTC paths for $E$ and $E'$ respectively. Let $(x_{\text{bound}}, m)$ be the point where the TTC path $\gamma'$ first hits the boundary of the box $[m, 1] \times [m, 1]$ containing all the highly ranked students. We remark that the TTC path $\gamma'$ for $E'$ has gradient $\frac{1}{x_{\text{bound}} + m} \begin{bmatrix} -x_{\text{bound}} \\ -m \end{bmatrix}$ from $(x_{\text{bound}}, m)$ to the TTC cutoffs $(x, y)$.

Consider the aggregate trade balance equations for students assigned before the TTC path reaches $(x_{\text{bound}}, m)$. They stipulate that the measure of students in $[0, m] \times [m, 1]$ who prefer school 1 is at most the measure of students who are either perturbed or in $[x_{\text{bound}}, 1] \times [0, m]$, and who prefer school 2. This means that $\frac{1}{2}m(1 - m) \leq \frac{1}{2} \left( (1 - m)^2 + m (1 - x_{\text{bound}}) \right)$, or $x_{\text{bound}} \leq m + \frac{(1 - m)^2}{m}$. It follows that $\gamma'$ hits the boundary of the box at a point that is to the left of where $\gamma$ hits the boundary box, and hence the path $\gamma'$ lies above the path $\gamma$.

E.5 Comparing Top Trading Cycles and Clinch and Trade

![Figure 17: Economy $E_1$ used in the proof of Proposition 8. The black borders partition the space of students into four regions. The density of students is zero on white areas, and constant on each of the shaded areas within a bordered region. In each of the four regions, the total measure of students within is equal to the total area (white and shaded) within the borders of the region.](image)

Proof of Proposition 8. Morrill (2015b) provides an example where C&T produces fewer blocking pairs than TTC. Both mechanisms give the same assignment for the symmetric economy in the beginning of Example 5. It remains to construct an

\footnote{That is, for each $x'$, if $(x', y')$ lies on $\gamma'$ and $(x', \bar{y})$ lies on $\gamma$, then $y' \geq \bar{y}$.}
Let economy $\mathcal{E}_1$ be defined as in Section E.4, that is, by taking an economy $\mathcal{E}$ with capacities $q_1 = q_2 = q = 0.455$ where students are equally likely to prefer each school and student priorities are uniformly distributed on $[0,1]$ independently for each school and independently of preferences, and changing the ranks of top priority students (those with rank $r_1^q, r_2^q \geq m = 0.6$) so that they have ranks uniformly distributed in the $\tilde{r} \times \tilde{r}$ square $(1-\tilde{r},1) \times (m,m + \tilde{r})$ for some $\tilde{r} \leq \frac{(2m-1)(1-m)}{2m}$. 

Recall that when running TTC on the economy $\mathcal{E}$ the cutoffs are given by $p^1 = (\bar{p}, \bar{p})$, where $\bar{p} = \sqrt{(1-2q)\frac{m^2}{1-2m+2m^2}}$ and $\bar{p} = \sqrt{(1-2q)\frac{1-2m+2m^2}{m^2}}$. The economy $\mathcal{E}_1$ is constructed by taking the economy $\mathcal{E}$ and redistributing school 2 rank among students with $r_2^q \leq \bar{p} \approx 0.25$ so that those with $r_1^q \geq \bar{p} \approx 0.36$ have higher school 2 rank. The C&T assignment for $\mathcal{E}_1$ is given by $p_1^1 = p_2^q = 0.3$, while TTC gives $p_1^2 = \bar{p} \approx 0.36$ and $p_2^2 = \bar{p} \approx 0.25$ (and under both $p_1^3 = p_2^q, p_2^2 = p_2^q$). Under TTC unmatched students will form blocking pairs only with school 2, while under C&T all unmatched students will form a blocking pair with either school. See Figure 17 for an illustration.

E.6 Bossyness of TTC Priorities

We provide a discrete example showing that TTC priorities are bossy. The two economies given by the two priority structures are depicted in Figure 18.

In both economies there are two schools with $q_1 = q_2 = 2$, and 5 students, $s_1, s_2, s_3, s_4, s_5$, such that $s_1, s_4$ prefer $1 \succ 2$, and $s_2, s_3, s_5$ prefer $2 \succ 1$. In economy $E_1$ school 1 priorities are $s_1 \succ s_2 \succ s_3 \succ s_4 \succ s_5$ and school 2 priorities are $s_1 \succ s_2 \succ s_4 \succ s_2 \succ s_5 \succ s_3$. In economy $E_2$ school 1 priorities are $s_2 \succ s_1 \succ s_3 \succ s_4 \succ s_1 \succ s_5 \succ s_2 \succ s_3$. That is, $s_1$ and $s_2$ are swapped.

In $E_1$ TTC first assigns $s_1$ to 1, then $(s_2, s_4)$ to $(2,1)$ via a trading cycle, and finally $s_5$ to 2. In $E_2$, TTC first assigns $s_2$ to 2, then $s_1$ to 1, and finally $(s_3, s_4)$ to $(2,1)$ via a trading cycle.

Notice that only the priorities of $s_1, s_2, s_4$ have changed relative to other students, and the assignment of these students is to 1, 2, 1 respectively under both sets of prior-

\footnote{Specifically, select $\ell_1 < \ell_2$. Among students with $r_2^q \leq \bar{p}$ and $r_1^q \geq \bar{p}$ the school 2 rank is distributed uniformly in the range $[\ell_2, \bar{p}]$. Among students with $r_2^q \leq \bar{p}$ and $r_1^q < \bar{p}$ the school 2 rank is distributed uniformly in the range $[0, \ell_1]$. Within each range $r_1^q$ and $r_2^q$ are still independent. See Figure 17 for an illustration.}
Figure 18: Bossy priorities under TTC. Students labeled in white prefer 1 \( \succ \) 2, and in black prefer 2 \( \succ \) 1. The color of the square indicates the student’s assignment, with green indicating school 1, blue indicating school 2, and pink indicating the student is unassigned. In both economy \( E_1 \) (left) and \( E_2 \) (right) there are 2 schools with \( q_1 = q_2 = 2 \). Between these two economies, only the relative priorities of \( s_1, s_2, s_4 \) are changed, but while the TTC assignments of these three students stay the same, the TTC assignments of \( s_3, s_5 \) differ.

However, the assignments of \( s_3, s_5 \) are affected: in \( E_1 \) student \( s_5 \) is assigned to 2 and \( s_3 \) is unassigned, and in \( E_2 \) student \( s_3 \) is assigned to 2 and \( s_5 \) is unassigned. This is because although changing the priorities of \( s_1, s_2, s_4 \) did not change the assignment of \( s_1, s_2, s_4 \), it changed the trading cycles. In \( E_2 \) \( s_3 \)'s high priority at school 1 was useful because it allowed her to trade with \( s_4 \); in \( E_1 \) it was not useful because \( s_4 \) had already traded with \( s_2 \).

\section{Proofs for Appendices A and B}

\subsection{Derivation of Marginal Trade Balance Equations}

In this section, we show that the marginal trade balance equations (2) hold,

\[
\sum_{a \in C} \gamma'_a (\tau) \cdot H^a_c (x) = \sum_{a \in C} \gamma'_c (\tau) \cdot H^a_c (x).
\]

The idea is that the measure of students who trade into a school \( c \) must be equal to the measure of students who trade out of \( c \).

In particular, suppose that at some time \( \tau \) the TTC algorithm has assigned exactly the set of students with rank better than \( x = \gamma(\tau) \), and the set of available schools is \( C \). Consider the incremental step of a TTC path \( \gamma \) from \( \gamma(\tau) = x \) over \( \epsilon \) units.
of time. The process of cycle clearing imposes that for any school \( c \in C \), the total amount of seats offered by school \( c \) from time \( \tau \) to \( \tau + \epsilon \) is equal to the amount of students assigned to \( c \) plus the amount of seats that were offered but not claimed or traded by the student it was over to over that same time period. In the continuum model the set of seats offered but not claimed or traded is of \( \eta \)-measure 0.\(^{55}\) Hence the set of students assigned to school \( c \) from time \( \tau \) to \( \tau + \epsilon \) has the same measure as the set of students who were offered a seat at school \( c \) in that time, \[ \eta \left( \{ \theta \in \Theta_c^C \mid r^\theta \in [\gamma(\tau + \epsilon), \gamma(\tau)] \} \right) = \eta \left( \{ \theta \in \Theta \mid \exists \tau' \in [\tau, \tau + \epsilon] \text{ s.t. } r^\theta_c = \gamma_c(\tau') \text{ and } r^\theta \leq \gamma(\tau') \} \right), \] or more compactly, \[ \eta \left( T^c_C(\gamma; [\tau, \tau + \epsilon]) \right) = \eta \left( T_c(\gamma; [\tau, \tau + \epsilon]) \right). \] (11)

We now prove that the marginal trade balance equations follow from equation (11). Following the notation in Appendix A.2, for \( b, c \in C \), \( x \in [0, 1]^C \), \( \alpha \in \mathbb{R} \) we define the set \(^{56}\) \[ T^c_c(x, \alpha) = \{ \theta \in \Theta_c^C \mid r^\theta \in [x - \alpha e^b, x] \}. \]

We may think of \( T^c_c(x, \alpha) \) as the set of the next \( \alpha \) students on school \( b \)'s priority list who are unassigned when \( \gamma(\tau) = x \), and want school \( c \). We remark that the sets used in the definition of the \( H^c_c(x) \) are precisely the sets \( T^c_c(x, \alpha) \).

We can use the sets \( T^c_c(x, \alpha) \) to approximate the expressions in equation (11) involving \( T_c(\gamma; \cdot) \) and \( T^c_c(\gamma; \cdot) \).

**Lemma 10.** Let \( \gamma(\tau) = x \) and for all \( \epsilon > 0 \) let \( \delta(\epsilon) = \gamma(\tau) - \gamma(\tau + \epsilon) \). For sufficiently small \( \epsilon \), during the interval \( [\tau, \tau + \epsilon] \), the set of students who were assigned to school \( c \) is \[ T^c_c(\gamma; [\tau, \tau + \epsilon]) = \bigcup_b T^c_b(x, \delta_b(\epsilon)). \]

\(^{55}\)A student can have a seat that is offered but not claimed or traded in one of two ways. The first is the seat is offered at time \( \tau \) and not yet claimed or traded. The second is that the student that got offered two or more seats at the same time \( \tau' \leq \tau \) (and was assigned through a trade involving only one seat). Both of these sets of students are of \( \eta \)-measure 0 under our assumptions.

\(^{56}\)We use the notation \( [x, \bar{x}] = \{ z \in \mathbb{R}^n \mid x_i \leq z_i < \bar{x}_i \ \forall i \} \) for \( x, \bar{x} \in \mathbb{R}^n \), and \( e^c \in \mathbb{R}^C \) is a vector whose \( c \)-th coordinate is equal to 1 and all other coordinates are 0.
and the set of students who were offered a seat at school $c$ is

$$T_c (\gamma; [\tau, \tau + \epsilon]) = \bigcup_d T^{d\mid C}_c \left( x - \sum_{c' \neq c} \delta_{c'} (\epsilon) e^{c'}, \delta_c (\epsilon) \right) \cup \Delta$$

for some small set $\Delta \subset \Theta$. Further, it holds that $\lim_{\tau \to 0} \frac{1}{\tau} \cdot \eta (\Delta) = 0$, and for any $c \neq c', d \neq d' \in C$ we have $\lim_{\tau \to 0} \frac{1}{\tau} \cdot \eta \left( T^{d\mid C}_c (x, \delta_c (\epsilon)) \cap T^{d\mid C}_{c'} (x, \delta_{c'} (\epsilon)) \right) = 0$ and $T^{d\mid C}_c (x, \delta_c (\tau)) \cap T^{d\mid C}_{c'} (x, \delta_{c'} (\epsilon)) = \phi$.

**Proof.** The first two equations are easily verified, and the fact that the last intersection is empty is also easy to verify. To show the bound on the measure of $\Delta$, we observe that it is contained in the set $\bigcup_d \left( T^{d\mid C}_c (x, \delta_c (\epsilon)) \cap T^{d\mid C}_{c'} (x, \delta_{c'} (\epsilon)) \right)$, so it suffices to show that $\lim_{\tau \to 0} \frac{1}{\tau} \cdot \eta \left( T^{d\mid C}_c (x, \delta_c (\epsilon)) \cap T^{d\mid C}_{c'} (x, \delta_{c'} (\epsilon)) \right) = 0$. This follows from the fact that the density defining $\eta$ is upper bounded by $M$, so

$$\eta \left( T^{d\mid C}_c (x, \delta_c (\epsilon)) \cap T^{d\mid C}_{c'} (x, \delta_{c'} (\epsilon)) \right) \leq M |\gamma_c (\tau) - \gamma_c (\tau + \epsilon)| |\gamma_{c'} (\tau) - \gamma_{c'} (\tau + \epsilon)|.$$

Since for all schools $c$ the function $\gamma_c$ is continuous and has bounded derivative, it is also Lipschitz continuous, so

$$\frac{1}{\tau} \eta (\Delta) \leq \frac{1}{\tau} \eta \left( T^{d\mid C}_c (x, \delta_c (\epsilon)) \cap T^{d\mid C}_{c'} (x, \delta_{c'} (\epsilon)) \right) \leq ML_c L_{c'} \epsilon$$

for some Lipschitz constants $L_c$ and $L_{c'}$ and the lemma follows. \qed

We now now ready to take limits and verify that equation (11) implies that the marginal trade balance equations hold. Let us divide equation (11) by $\delta_c (\epsilon) =$
\(\gamma_c(\tau) - \gamma_c(\tau + \epsilon)\) and take the limit as \(\epsilon \to 0\). Then on the left hand side we obtain

\[
\lim_{\epsilon \to 0} \frac{1}{\delta_c(\epsilon)} \eta \left( T^{a|C_c} \left( \gamma; \tau, \tau + \epsilon \right) \right) = \lim_{\epsilon \to 0} \frac{1}{\delta_c(\epsilon)} \eta \left( \bigcup_b T^{b|C_c} (x, \delta_b(\epsilon)) \right) \quad \text{(Lemma 10)}
\]

\[
= \lim_{\epsilon \to 0} \left[ \sum_{b \in C} \frac{1}{\delta_c(\epsilon)} \eta \left( T^{b|C_c} (x, \delta_b(\epsilon)) \right) + O \left( \frac{\|\gamma(\tau) - \gamma(\tau + \epsilon)\|_\infty^2}{\delta_c(\epsilon)} \right) \right]
\]

(as density is bounded, \(\nu < M\))

\[
= \lim_{\epsilon \to 0} \left[ \sum_{b \in C} \frac{\delta_b(\epsilon)}{\delta_c(\epsilon)} \eta \left( T^{b|C_c} (x, \delta_b(\epsilon)) \right) \right] \quad \text{(\(\gamma\) Lipschitz continuous)}
\]

\[
= \lim_{\epsilon \to 0} \left[ \sum_{\theta \in \Theta^{a|C}} \theta \in [x - \delta_b(\epsilon) \cdot e^\theta, x] \right] \quad \text{(by definition of \(\delta\) and \(H\))}
\]

as required. Similarly, on the right hand side we obtain

\[
\lim_{\epsilon \to 0} \frac{1}{\delta_c(\epsilon)} \eta \left( T_c (\gamma; [\tau, \tau + \epsilon]) \right)
\]

\[
= \lim_{\epsilon \to 0} \left[ \sum_{a \in C} \frac{1}{\delta_c(\epsilon)} \eta \left( T^{a|C_c} (x - \sum_{e' \neq c} \delta_{e'}(\epsilon) e^\theta, \delta_c(\epsilon)) \right) \right] + O \left( \frac{\|\gamma(\tau + \epsilon) - \gamma(\tau)\|_\infty^2}{\delta_c(\epsilon)} \right) \quad \text{(Lemma 10)}
\]

\[
= \lim_{\epsilon \to 0} \left[ \sum_{a \in C} \frac{1}{\delta_c(\epsilon)} \eta \left( T^{a|C_c} (x - \sum_{e' \neq c} \delta_{e'}(\epsilon) e^\theta, \delta_c(\epsilon)) \right) \right] \quad \text{(\(\gamma\) is Lipschitz continuous)}
\]

\[
= \lim_{\epsilon \to 0} \left[ \sum_{a \in C} \frac{1}{\delta_c(\epsilon)} \eta \left( \left\{ \theta \in \Theta^{a|C} \mid r^\theta \in [x - \delta(\epsilon), x - \sum_{e' \neq c} \delta_{e'}(\epsilon) e^\theta] \right\} \right) \right]
\]

\[
= \sum_{a \in C} H^{a|C}_c (x) \quad \text{(by definition of \(\delta\) and \(H\))}
\]

as required. This completes the proof.

### F.2 Proof of Theorem 3

Consider two continuum economies \(\mathcal{E} = (\mathcal{C}, \Theta, \eta, q)\) and \(\tilde{\mathcal{E}} = (\mathcal{C}, \Theta, \tilde{\eta}, q)\), where the measures \(\eta\) and \(\tilde{\eta}\) satisfy the assumptions given in Section 3. Suppose also that the measure \(\eta\) and \(\tilde{\eta}\) have total variation distance \(\epsilon\) and have full support. Let \(\gamma\) be a TTC path for economy \(\mathcal{E}\), and let \(\tilde{\gamma}\) be a TTC path for economy \(\tilde{\mathcal{E}}\). Consider any school \(c\) and any points \(x = \gamma(t) \in \text{Im} (\gamma), \tilde{x} = \tilde{\gamma}(\tilde{t}) \in \text{Im} (\tilde{\gamma})\) such that \(x_c = \tilde{x}_c\),
and both are cleared in the first round of their respective TTC runs, \( t \leq t^{(1)} \) and \( \tilde{t} \leq \tilde{t}^{(1)} \). We show that the set of students allocated to school \( c \) under \( TTC(\gamma) \) from time 0 to \( t \) differs from the set of students allocated to school \( c \) under \( TTC(\tilde{\gamma}) \) from time 0 to \( \tilde{t} \) by a set of measure \( O(\varepsilon |C|) \).

**Proposition 11.** Suppose that \( \gamma, \tilde{\gamma} \) are TTC paths in one round of the continuum economies \( \mathcal{E} \) and \( \tilde{\mathcal{E}} \) respectively, where the set of available schools \( C \) is the same in these rounds of \( TTC(\gamma) \) and \( TTC(\tilde{\gamma}) \). Suppose also that \( \gamma \) starts and ends at \( x, y \), and \( \tilde{\gamma} \) starts and ends at \( \tilde{x}, \tilde{y} \), where there exist \( b, c \in C \) such that \( x_b = \tilde{x}_b, y_c = \tilde{y}_c \), and \( x_a \leq \tilde{x}_a, y_a \leq \tilde{y}_a \) for all \( a \in C \). Then for all \( c \in C \), the set of students with ranks in \( (y, x] \cap (\tilde{y}, \tilde{x}] \) who are assigned to \( c \) under \( TTC(\gamma) \) and not under \( TTC(\tilde{\gamma}) \) has measure \( O(\varepsilon |C|) \).

**Proof.** By Lemma 4, we may assume without loss of generality that \( \gamma \) and \( \tilde{\gamma} \) are parametrized such that \( x = \gamma(0), y = \gamma(1) \) and \( \tilde{x} = \tilde{\gamma}(0), \tilde{y} = \tilde{\gamma}(1) \), and for all times \( \tau \in [0,1] \) there exists a school \( c(\tau) \) such that \( \gamma(\tau) \) is dominated by \( \tilde{\gamma}(\tau) \) via school \( c(\tau) \).

Let \( T_c = \{ \tau \leq 1 : c(\tau) = c \} \) be the times when \( \gamma \) is dominated by \( \tilde{\gamma} \) via school \( c \). We remark that, by our construction in Lemma 4, we may assume that \( T_c \) is the countable union of disjoint closed intervals, and that if \( c \neq c' \) then \( T_c \) and \( T_{c'} \) have disjoint interiors.

Since \( \gamma \) is a TTC path for \( \mathcal{E} \) and \( \tilde{\gamma} \) is a TTC path for \( \tilde{\mathcal{E}} \), by integrating over the marginal trade balance equations we can show that the following trade balance equations hold,

\[
\eta(T_c(\gamma; T_c)) = \eta(T_{c|C}(\gamma; T_c)) \quad \text{for all } c \in C. \quad (12)
\]

\[
\tilde{\eta}(T_c(\tilde{\gamma}; T_c)) = \tilde{\eta}(T_{c|C}(\tilde{\gamma}; T_c)) \quad \text{for all } c \in C. \quad (13)
\]

Since \( \gamma \) is dominated by \( \tilde{\gamma} \) via school \( b \) at all times \( \tau \in T_b \), we have that

\[
T_b(\gamma; T_b) \subseteq T_b(\tilde{\gamma}; T_b). \quad (14)
\]

Moreover, by the choice of parametrization, \( \cup_b T_b = [0,1] \) and so, since \( x \leq \tilde{x} \),

\[
\cup_{b,c} T_{c|C}(\gamma; T_b) \supseteq \cup_{b,c} T_{c|C}(\tilde{\gamma}; T_b). \quad (15)
\]

\[^{57}\text{This is according to both measures } \eta \text{ and } \tilde{\eta}.\]
Now since \( \eta, \tilde{\eta} \) have total variation \( \varepsilon \), for every school \( c \) it holds that

\[
\eta(\mathcal{T}^{c|C}(\gamma; T_c) \setminus \mathcal{T}^{c|C}(\tilde{\gamma}; T_c)) \leq \eta(\mathcal{T}^{c|C}(\gamma; T_c)) - \eta(\mathcal{T}^{c|C}(\tilde{\gamma}; T_c)) + \varepsilon \quad \text{(by (15))}
\]

\[
= \eta(T_c(\gamma; T_c)) - \tilde{\eta}(T_c(\tilde{\gamma}; T_c)) + \varepsilon \quad \text{(by (12) and (13))}
\]

\[
\leq 2\varepsilon \quad \text{(by (14)), (16)}.
\]

Also, for all schools \( b \neq c \), since \( \eta \) has full support and bounded density \( \nu \in [m, M] \), it holds that

\[
\eta(\mathcal{T}^{c|C}(\gamma; T_b) \setminus \mathcal{T}^{c|C}(\tilde{\gamma}; T_b)) \leq M^m \eta(\mathcal{T}^{b|C}(\gamma; T_b) \setminus \mathcal{T}^{b|C}(\tilde{\gamma}; T_b)) \quad \text{(17)}
\]

Hence, as \( T_b \) have disjoint interiors,

\[
\eta(\mathcal{T}^{c|C}(\gamma; 1) \setminus \mathcal{T}^{c|C}(\tilde{\gamma}; 1)) = \sum_{bc} \eta(\mathcal{T}^{c|C}(\gamma; T_b)) - \eta(\mathcal{T}^{c|C}(\tilde{\gamma}; T_b)) \quad \text{(by (15))}
\]

\[
\leq \sum_{bc} \eta(\mathcal{T}^{c|C}(\gamma; T_b) \setminus \mathcal{T}^{c|C}(\tilde{\gamma}; T_b))
\]

\[
\leq \sum_{bc} M^m \eta(\mathcal{T}^{b|C}(\gamma; T_b) \setminus \mathcal{T}^{b|C}(\tilde{\gamma}; T_b)) \quad \text{(by (17))}
\]

\[
\leq 2|C|\varepsilon \frac{M^m}{m} \quad \text{(by (16)).}
\]

That is, given a school \( c \), the set of students assigned to school \( c \) with score \( r^\theta \not\leq x \) under \( \gamma \) and not assigned to school \( c \) with score \( r^\theta \not\leq \tilde{x} \) under \( \tilde{\gamma} \) has \( \eta \)-measure \( \mathcal{O}(\varepsilon |C|) \). The result for \( \tilde{\eta} \) follows from the fact that the total variation distance of \( \eta \) and \( \tilde{\eta} \) is \( \varepsilon \).

We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.

Proof of Theorem 3. Assume without loss of generality that the schools are labeled in order. Let \( \sigma \) be a permutation such that if we reindex school \( \sigma(c) \) to be school \( c \) then the schools are labeled in order under \( \text{TTC}(\tilde{\gamma}) \). We show by induction on \( \ell \) that \( \sigma(\ell) = \ell \) and that for all schools \( c \), the set of students assigned to \( c \) under \( \text{TTC}(\gamma) \) by the end of the \( \ell \)th round and not under \( \text{TTC}(\tilde{\gamma}) \) by the end of the \( \ell \)th round has \( \eta \)-measure \( \mathcal{O}(\varepsilon \ell |C|) \). This will prove the theorem.

We first consider the base case \( \ell = 1 \). Let \( x = \tilde{x} = \gamma(0) \) and \( y = \gamma(t^{(1)}) \). Define \( \tilde{y} \in \text{Im}(\tilde{\gamma}) \) to be the minimal point such that \( y \leq \tilde{y} \) and there exists \( c \) such
that $y_c = \tilde{y}_c$. We show that $\tilde{y}$ is near $\tilde{\gamma}(\tilde{t}^{(1)})$, i.e. $|\tilde{y} - \tilde{\gamma}(\tilde{t}^{(1)})|_2 = O(\varepsilon)$. Now by Proposition 11 the set of students with ranks in $(y, \gamma(0)] \cap (\tilde{y}, \gamma(0))$ who are assigned to 1 under $TTC(\gamma)$ and not under $TTC(\tilde{\gamma})$ has $\tilde{\eta}$-measure $O(\varepsilon |C|)$. Hence the residual capacity of school 1 at $\tilde{y}$ under $TTC(\tilde{\gamma})$ is $O(\varepsilon |C|)$, and so since $\tilde{\eta}$ has full support and has density bounded from above and below by $M$ and $m$, it holds that $|\tilde{y} - \tilde{\gamma}(\tilde{t}^{(1)})|_2 = O\left(\frac{M}{m}\varepsilon |C|\right)$. (If the residual capacity is negative we can exchange the roles of $\gamma$ and $\tilde{\gamma}$ and argue similarly.)

Let us now show that the inductive assumption holds. Fix a school $c$. Then by Proposition 11 the set of students with ranks in $(y, \gamma(0)] \cap (\tilde{y}, \gamma(0))$ who are assigned to $c$ under $TTC(\gamma)$ and not under $TTC(\tilde{\gamma})$ has $\tilde{\eta}$-measure $O(\varepsilon |C|)$. Moreover, since $|\tilde{y} - \tilde{\gamma}(\tilde{t}^{(1)})|_2 = O\left(\frac{M}{m}\varepsilon |C|\right)$ and $\tilde{\eta}$ has full support and has density bounded from above and below by $M$ and $m$, the set of students with ranks in $(\tilde{y}, \tilde{\gamma}(\tilde{t}^{(1)}))$ assigned to school $c$ by $TTC(\tilde{\gamma})$ has $\tilde{\eta}$-measure $O(\varepsilon |C|)$. Hence the set of students assigned to $c$ under $TTC(\gamma)$ by time $t^{(1)}$ and not under $TTC(\tilde{\gamma})$ by time $\tilde{t}^{(1)}$ has $\eta$-measure $O(\varepsilon |C|)$. Moreover, if $t^{(1)} < t^{(2)}$ then for sufficiently small $\varepsilon$ it holds that $\tilde{t}^{(1)} = \min_c \tilde{t}^{(c)}$, and otherwise there exists a relabeling of the schools such that this is true, and so $\sigma(1) = 1$.

We now show the inductive step, proving for $\ell + 1$ assuming true for $1, 2, \ldots, \ell$. By inductive assumption, for all $c$ the measure of students assigned to $c$ under $TTC(\gamma)$ and not under $TTC(\tilde{\gamma})$ by the points $\gamma(t^{(\ell)}), \tilde{\gamma}(\tilde{t}^{(\ell)})$ is $O(\varepsilon \ell |C|)$ for all $c$.

Let $x = \gamma(t^{(\ell)})$ and $y = \gamma(t^{(\ell + 1)})$. Define $\tilde{x} \in \text{Im}(\tilde{\gamma})$ to be the minimal point such that $x \leq \tilde{x}$ and there exists $b$ such that $x_b = \tilde{x}_b$. We show that $\tilde{x}$ is near $\tilde{\gamma}(\tilde{t}^{(\ell)})$, i.e. $|\tilde{x} - \tilde{\gamma}(\tilde{t}^{(\ell)})|_2 = O(\varepsilon)$. Now by inductive assumption $\eta \left( \{ x \mid x^\theta \in (x = \gamma(t^{(\ell)}), \tilde{\gamma}(\tilde{t}^{(\ell)}) \} \right) = O(\varepsilon \ell |C|)$ and so $|x - \tilde{\gamma}(\tilde{t}^{(\ell)})|_2 = O(\varepsilon)$. Moreover $|\tilde{x}_b - \tilde{\gamma}_b(\tilde{t}^{(\ell)})|_2 = |x_b - \tilde{\gamma}_b(\tilde{t}^{(\ell)})|_2$ which we have just shown is $O(\varepsilon)$. Finally, since $\eta$ has full support and has density bounded from above and below by $M$ and $m$, it holds that $\max_{b,c,\tau} \frac{\gamma^{(\tau)}(\tau)}{\tilde{\gamma}^{(\tau)}(\tau)} = O\left(\frac{M}{m}\right)$ and so for all $c$ it holds that $|\tilde{x}_c - \tilde{\gamma}_c(\tilde{t}^{(\ell)})|_2 \leq O\left(\frac{M}{m}\varepsilon\right)$.

The remainder of the proof runs much the same as in the base case, with slight adjustments to account for the fact that $x \neq \tilde{x}$. Define $\tilde{y} \in \text{Im}(\tilde{\gamma})$ to be the minimal point such that $y \leq \tilde{y}$ and there exists $c$ such that $y_c = \tilde{y}_c$. We show that $\tilde{y}$ is near $\tilde{\gamma}(\tilde{t}^{(\ell + 1)})$, i.e. $|\tilde{y} - \tilde{\gamma}(\tilde{t}^{(\ell + 1)})|_2 = O(\varepsilon)$. Now by Proposition 11 the set of students with ranks in $(y, x] \cap (\tilde{y}, \tilde{x}]$ who are assigned to $\ell + 1$ under $TTC(\gamma)$ and not under $TTC(\tilde{\gamma})$ has $\tilde{\eta}$-measure $O(\varepsilon |C|)$. This, together with the inductive assumption that the difference in students assigned to school $\ell$ is $O(\varepsilon \ell |C|)$, shows that the residual capacity of school $\ell + 1$ at $\tilde{y}$ under $TTC(\tilde{\gamma})$ is $O(\varepsilon (\ell + 1) |C|)$, and so since $\tilde{\eta}$ has
full support and has density bounded from above and below by $M$ and $m$, it holds that $|\tilde{y} - \tilde{\gamma}(\tilde{t}(\ell + 1))|_2 = O\left(\frac{M}{m}\varepsilon(\ell + 1)|C|\right)$. (If the residual capacity is negative we can exchange the roles of $\gamma$ and $\tilde{\gamma}$ and argue similarly.)

Let us now show that the inductive assumption holds. Fix a school $c$. Then by Proposition 11 the set of students with ranks in $(y, x] \cap (\tilde{y}, \tilde{x}]$ who are assigned to $c$ under $TTC(\gamma)$ and not under $TTC(\tilde{\gamma})$ has $\tilde{\eta}$-measure $O(\varepsilon|C|)$. Moreover, since $|\tilde{y} - \tilde{\gamma}(\tilde{t}(\ell + 1))|_2 = O\left(\frac{M}{m}\varepsilon(\ell + 1)|C|\right)$ and $\tilde{\eta}$ has full support and has density bounded from above and below by $M$ and $m$, the set of students with ranks in $(\tilde{y}, \tilde{\gamma}(\tilde{t}(\ell + 1))]$ assigned to school $c$ by $TTC(\tilde{\gamma})$ has $\tilde{\eta}$-measure $O(\varepsilon(\ell + 1)|C|)$. Hence the set of students assigned to $c$ under $TTC(\gamma)$ by time $t(\ell + 1)$ and not under $TTC(\tilde{\gamma})$ by time $\tilde{t}(\ell + 1)$ has $\eta$-measure $O(\varepsilon(\ell + 1)|C|)$. Moreover if $t(\ell + 1) < t(\ell + 2)$ then for sufficiently small $\varepsilon$ it holds that $\tilde{t}(\ell + 1) = \min_{c > \ell} \tilde{t}(c)$, and otherwise there exists a relabeling of the schools such that this is true, and so $\sigma(\ell + 1) = \ell + 1$. \qed